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ARTICLES 
THE POVERTY DEFENSE 
Michele Estrin Gilman * 
INTRODUCTION 
Is stealing a loaf of bread to feed a starving family of eight a 
crime? Or, is poverty a defense? In Victor Hugo's classic, Les Mi-
serables, the protagonist, Jean Valjean, commits this crime and is 
sentenced to five years of hard labor.1 Hugo clearly intends the 
reader to sympathize with Valjean. The punishment not only 
seems grossly disproportionate to the crime, but Valjean also 
seemingly had no other choice. While Valjean's crime may inspire 
sympathy among readers (and musical theater aficionados alike), 
it is widely assumed and accepted in our American criminal jus-
tice system that poverty is not a defense to crime. 2 In 1971, Judge 
David Bazelon of the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia famously challenged this assumption, arguing, 
in dissent to a decision upholding a murder conviction, that juries 
should be allowed to consider a defendant's "rotten social back-
ground"-that is, how growing up under circumstances of severe 
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Feminism, University of Baltimore School of Law; B.A., Duke University; J.D., University 
of Michigan Law School. I would like to thank Matthew Fraidin, Leigh Goodmark, Dan 
Hatcher, David Jaros, Margaret Johnson, Katie Loncarich, Libba Patterson, Lisa Pruitt, 
and Robert Rubinson for their thoughtful comments on this article, as well as participants 
at the Feminist Legal Theory Collaborative at George Washington University Law School 
and the Class Crits IV conference at American University Washington College of Law. 
1. VICTOR HUGO, LES MrSERABLES 30 (Charles E. Wilbour trans., Blue Ribbon Books 
1943) (1862). 
2. See, e.g., United States v. Alexander, 471 F.2d 923, 926 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (rejecting 
the rotten social background defense). 
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environmental deprivation can subsequently influence a criminal 
defendant's mental state and actions.3 
In turn, Bazelon's dissent spurred a lively academic debate as 
to whether the law should recognize a poverty defense, what such 
a defense would look like, and how it would operate. The question 
is presumed to be the stuff of the ivory tower; one scholar deemed 
it "entirely the province of intellectuals engaged in scholarly de-
bate."4 Gone unnoticed in this debate is that one area of law rec-
ognizes a poverty defense to wrongful conduct, and this defense is 
implicated in thousands of cases a year. In both civil and criminal 
child neglect cases, various states recognize that conduct that 
would otherwise be considered neglect is excused on account of a 
parent's poverty.5 In short, a poverty defense is not hypothetical. 
The child neglect case law provides evidence about how the pov-
erty defense works in practice and can guide scholars-and more 
importantly, lawmakers and courts-in considering whether to 
extend a poverty defense to other areas of the law. 
Considering a poverty defense is timely in light of our increas-
ing poverty rate and the correlation between poverty and crime. 
As of 2010, more than fifteen percent of all Americans live below 
the federal government's official poverty line,6 which is $22,314 
for a family of four (meaning that a family earning $22,315 is not 
considered poor).7 Twenty million Americans, or 6.7 percent of the 
population, live in extreme poverty, defined as those living at fifty 
percent or less of the official poverty level. 8 Of people in the labor 
force, 7.2 percent-or more than ten million people-do not earn 
enough to be lifted out of poverty. 9 While the link between crime 
and poverty is complex, statistics show unequivocally that poor 
3. [d. at 960 (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting). 
4. Stephen J. Morse, Severe Environmental Deprivation (AKA RSB): A Tragedy, Not 
a Defense, 2 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 147, 170 (2011); see also Richard Delgado, The 
Wretched of the Earth, 2 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 1, 5 (2011) [hereinafter Delgado, 
Wretched of the Earth] ("I take it as given that the country has not adopted a rotten social 
background defense and is unlikely to do so anytime soon."). 
5. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-2301(9)(A)(ii) (2012); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.01(44) (West 
2010). 
6. CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND 
HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2010, at 14 (2011), available at 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/p60-239.pdf. 
7. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POVERTY THRESHOLDS 2010, available at http://www.cen 
sus.govlhhes/www/poverty/datalthreshldlindex.html. 
8. DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., supra note 6, at 19. 
9. [d. at 15. 
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people are overrepresented in the criminal justice system.lO Fur-
ther, mass incarceration policies have a particularly devastating 
impact on low-income, Mrican American, urban communities, as 
one-third of black men in their twenties are under supervision of 
the criminal justice system. ll "By reducing parental capacity to 
parent children, by further weakening already challenged family 
structures and resources, and by making already disadvantaged 
families and communities even less economically viable, incarcer-
ation helps to reify a social dynamic that is likely to encourage 
further involvement in crime.,,12 This was the cycle that Judge 
Bazelon hoped to break, or at least expose, when he proposed the 
"rotten social background" defense. 
In addition to these dynamics, poverty is becoming increasingly 
criminalized. Cities across America are making the daily tasks of 
living for the homeless a crime, passing laws that forbid sleeping, 
eating, begging, or sitting in public spaces. 13 In some cities, it is 
even illegal for groups or individuals to serve food to homeless 
people. 14 At the same time, at least eighty percent of reporting ju-
risdictions that criminalize homeless ness lack adequate shelter 
space, public toilets, or storage facilities for the homeless to keep 
their belongings.15 Thus, a lack of services creates the very condi-
tions of lawlessness. Ie In addition, states, while intensifying wel-
10. See Erica J. Hashimoto, Class Matters, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 31, 55-58 
(2011) (making a persuasive case for better data collection about the economic status of 
persons involved in the criminal justice system); see also Stuart P. Green, Hard Times, 
Hard Time: Retributive Justice for Unjustly Disadvantaged Offenders, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL 
F. 43, 46-47 (2010) (analyzing Department of Justice figures); Andrew Karmen, Poverty, 
Crime, and Criminal Justice, in FROM SOCIAL JUSTICE TO CRIMINAL JUSTICE 25, 29-30 
(William C. Heffernan & John Kleinig eds., 2000) (listing theories that explain why pov-
erty leads to crime). 
11. Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in African 
American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1272, 1281-82, 1285, 1291, 1293-94 
(2004); see also Todd R. Clear, The Effects of High Imprisonment Rates on Communities, 
37 CRIME & JUST. 97, 100, 102 (2008). 
12. Lawrence D. Bobo, Crime, Urban Poverty, and Social Science, 6 Du BOIS REV.: 
SOC. SCI. RES. ON RACE 273, 276 (2009). 
13. NAT'L LAw CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, CRIMINALIZING CRISIS: THE 
CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMELESSNESS IN U.S. CITIES 6-8 (2011), available at http://www. 
nlchp.orgicontentJpubs/l 1. 14. 11 %20Criminalization%20Report%20&%20Advocacy%20Ma 
nual, %20FINAL1.pdf. 
14. Id. at 7,38. 
15. Id. at 7. 
16. See Barbara Ehrenreich, Is It Now a Crime to be Poor?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2009, 
at WK9 (describing the arrest and jailing of a person in a homeless shelter for failing to 
appear in court on a charge of criminal trespassing that arose from sleeping on a side-
walk). 
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fare fraud prosecutions, increasingly treat poor people who resort 
to public benefits as criminals, subjecting them to fingerprinting, 
biometric imaging, ongoing surveillance, and drug testing as a 
condition for receiving benefits. 17 While debtors' prisons have 
formally been abolished, the reality is that courts are increasingly 
jailing poor people who cannot payoff their debts; and, in many 
cases, these debtors are not even aware that they are being pur-
sued by creditors due to "sloppy, incomplete or even false docu-
mentation."!8 A poverty defense has the potential to serve as a 
corrective to these trends. 
Scholars have articulated at least three differing conceptions of 
a poverty defense, each of which are reflected in the child neglect 
case law. In some cases, the child neglect poverty defense most 
closely resembles traditional criminal law defenses of either ne-
cessity or duress, in which external forces that compel a defend-
ant to engage in wrongful conduct lessen or extinguish culpabil-
ity.!9 Other approaches reflect Judge Bazelon's idea of rotten 
social background, in which an impoverished upbringing renders 
a parent unable to fulfill parenting duties. 20 In a third approach, 
the poverty defense embodies social forfeit theory, in which socie-
ty's tolerance of severe economic inequality deprives society of the 
moral authority to blame deprived defendants for their conduct.2! 
Regardless of the court's theoretical underpinning, the poverty 
defense rarely succeeds unless the court has a sophisticated un-
derstanding of poverty and how it leads to neglect. Thus, this ar-
ticle argues that not only is the poverty defense an established 
(albeit overlooked) feature of American law that can be expanded 
17. See Michele Estrin Gilman, The Class Differential in Poverty Law, 77 BROOK. L. 
REV. 1389 (2012); Kaaryn Gustafson, The Criminalization of Poverty, 99 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 643, 659, 674-79 (2009). 
18. Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Welcome to Debtors' Prison, 2011 Edition, WALL ST. J., 
Mar. 17, 2011, at C1 (noting that more than a third of states allow borrowers who do not 
pay their bills to be jailed). In addition, states are increasingly charging criminal justice 
user fees; defendants are required to pay for "everything from probation supervision, to 
jail stays, to the use of a constitutionally required public defender. Every stage of the crim-
inal justice process, it seems, has become ripe for a surcharge." ALICIA BANNON ET AL., 
BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEBT: A BARRIER TO REENTRY 4 (2010), 
available at http://brennan.3cdn.netJc610802495d901dac3_76m6vqhpy.pdf. 
19. David M. Smith, Note, A Theoretical and Legal Challenge to Homeless Criminali-
zation as Public Policy, 12 YALE L. & POL'y REV. 487, 501-02 (1994). 
20. David L. Bazelon, The Morality of the Criminal Law, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 385, 403-
04 (1976) [hereinafter Bazelon, Morality of the Criminal Lawl. 
21. Green, supra note 10, at 54-55. 
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into other areas, but also that it will not fulfill its potential with-
out a rich conception of poverty. 
The article proceeds as follows. Section I explains the major 
theoretical justifications for excusing poor defendants for commit-
ting wrongful conduct and sets forth the objections to a poverty 
defense. Section II provides the context for the poverty defense in 
child neglect cases, exploring the link between poverty and child 
neglect and the scope of the poverty defense. Section III analyzes 
how courts interpret the poverty defense in child neglect cases, 
demonstrating that all three theoretical approaches to a poverty 
defense are found in the case law. As Section III explains, a 
court's conception of poverty drives its interpretation of the pov-
erty defense. Courts that see poverty as rooted in structural caus-
es are more amenable to the defense than courts that view pov-
erty as a result of behavioral failings. Section IV draws lessons 
from how the poverty defense is applied in child neglect cases in 
order to inform other areas of the law. Section IV concludes that 
the poverty defense is not the impossible pipedream painted by 
its critics. Nevertheless, the defense has not fulfilled its potential 
because many courts lack a sophisticated understanding of how 
poverty is related to neglect. Moreover, courts are often uncom-
fortable with the implications of the poverty defense and how it 
conflicts with accepted norms of individual culpability. According-
ly, Section IV provides ideas for strengthening the poverty de-
fense and suggests areas for its expansion. 
1. THEORETICAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR EXCUSING 
POOR DEFENDANTS 
Although the conventional wisdom is that there is no poverty 
defense, progressive scholars have taken Judge Bazelon's lead 
and attempted to construct the theoretical scaffolding for building 
one. Under the first theory, "rotten social background" ("RSB"), 
also known as "severe environmental deprivation," can cause a 
defendant to commit a crime, thereby diminishing his responsibil-
ity, similar to a defense of diminished capacity or insanity. The 
RSB defense is also justified with regards to social forfeit ,theory, 
which holds society morally responsible for its socio-economic 
failures. Under the second theory, current economic hardship can 
create conditions of coercion such that a poor person has no 
meaningful alternative other than to commit an offense. While 
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the RSB defense focuses on how a person's history of deprivation 
shapes responses to present stimuli, the economic coercion de-
fense focuses instead on how current deprivation impacts deci-
sion-making. While theorists assert that the law (either rightly or 
wrongly) fails to recognize either form of these poverty defenses, 
in fact, both of these versions of the poverty defense have been 
recognized within the law of child neglect. The case law suggests 
that a poverty defense can not only help individual poor defend-
ants but also benefit society more widely through redistributive 
consequences that can ultimately reduce crime. This section ex-
amines the theoretical models for a possible poverty defense, as 
well as the objections to these proposals. 
A. Rotten Social Background/ Severe Environmental Deprivation 
1. The Theory 
In 1973, D.C. Circuit Judge David Bazelon introduced the theo-
ry of an RSB defense in his dissent in United States v. Alexan-
der.22 In that case, an Mrican American defendant was convicted 
of killing two unarmed Marines after one of them hurled racial 
epithets at the defendant and his friends in a hamburger shop.23 
A psychiatrist who examined the defendant testified at trial that 
the defendant was delusional due to a preoccupation with racial 
injustice and "the idea that racial war was inevitable."24 Accord-
ingly, the psychiatrist concluded that the defendant may have 
had an "irresistible impulse to shoot" after the victim called him a 
''black bastard.,,25 This emotional disorder was rooted in the de-
fendant's childhood, during which time he was raised by a single 
mother in a low-income neighborhood in the Watts neighborhood 
of Los Angeles in a crowded home with little money, attention, or 
love.26 
Accordingly, defense counsel sought to argue that defendant's 
"rotten social background" conditioned him to respond to certain 
stimuli such that he had no meaningful choice when targeted 
22. 471 F.2d 923, 960 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting). 
23. Id. at 926. 
24. Id. at 957. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. at 957-58. 
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with racial insults. 27 However, the trial court instructed the jury 
to ignore any evidence related to the defendant's RSB.28 In dis-
sent, Judge Bazelon contended that denying the RSB defense was 
an error because the denial stripped the jury of the opportunity to 
consider the "crucial, functional question-did the defendant lack 
the ability to make any meaningful choice of action[?]"29 For 
Judge Bazelon, a RSB could cause an impairment similar to a 
mental illness, thereby rendering defendants less culpable. 30 
Judge Bazelon acknowledged the difficulty of permitting an 
RSB defense, especially when dealing with a defendant who has 
committed a violent crime and may still be dangerous. 31 He iden-
tified four possible approaches for dealing with defendants suffer-
ing from RSB: (1) confinement, (2) release, (3) therapeutic con-
finement, and (4) preventative detention. 32 None of these were 
satisfactory.33 First, confinement is inconsistent with a lack of re-
sponsibility.34 Second, release would be publicly and politically 
unpalatable.35 Third, therapeutic confinement may be pointless 
for a defendant who is not mentally il1.36 Fourth, preventative de-
tention could lead to huge swaths of the poor being detained in 
order to prevent crime.37 Despite the unsettled ramifications of 
recognizing an RSB defense, Judge Bazelon argued that permit-
ting the defense would force society to examine the causes of 
crime and to consider "whether income redistribution and social 
reconstruction are indispensable first steps toward solving the 
problem of violent crime.,,38 
Professor Richard Delgado subsequently fleshed out the pa-
rameters of an RSB defense. 39 Pulling together extensive social 
27. Id. at 959; cf. Delgado, Wretched of the Earth, supra note 4, at 7-8 (arguing that 
the use of the term RSB "is a distancing move" and preferring the term severe environ· 
mental deprivation). 
28. Alexander, 471 F.2d at 959 (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting). 
29. Id. at 961. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. at 961-62. 
32. Id. at 962-64. 
33. Id. 
34. Id. at 962. 
35. Id. at 963. 
36. See id. 
37. Id. at 964. 
38. Id. at 965. 
39. Richard Delgado, "Rotten Social Background'~' Should the Criminal Law Recognize 
a Defense of Severe Environmental Deprivation?, 3 LAW & INEQ. 9, 11-12 (1985) [hereinaf-
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science data, he explored the correlations between poverty and 
crime, noting that while the vast majority of poor people do not 
violate the law, most criminal offenders are from poor back-
grounds.40 As he stated, "An environment of extreme poverty and 
deprivation creates in individuals a propensity to commit crimes," 
such that punishing the individual is unfair.4! In other words, 
''blame is inappropriate when a 'defendant's criminal behavior is 
caused by extrinsic factors beyond his or her control.,,42 The re-
search relied on by Professor Delgado shows that crime is usually 
caused by frustration-aggression, which can result from inequali-
ty.43 In turn, inequality is generated and reinforced through pov-
erty, unemployment, poor living conditions, bad schools, police 
brutality, violent neighborhoods, alternative value systems, sin-
gle-parent families, and racism." When impoverishment renders 
a defendant unable to control her conduct, the RSB defense ex-
cuses that conduct.45 
In addition to the idea that RSB impacts behavior, Judge Ba-
zelon also suggested a social forfeit justification for an RSB de-
fense. He contended that society loses its moral justification for 
punishing poor criminal defendants when it refuses to remedy 
conditions of inequality!6 As he stated, "[I]t is simply unjust to 
place people in dehumanizing social conditions, to do nothing 
about those conditions, and then to command those who suffer, 
'Behave-or else!",47 In short, the law should "convictO only when 
it can condemn.,,48 As Professor Delgado elaborates, society loses 
ter Delgado, Rotten Social Background]; Delgado, Wretched of the Earth, supra note 4, at 
1, nn.6-7. 
40. Delgado, Rotten Social Background, supra note 39, at 10. The social science data 
on the connection between crime and poverty has strengthened considerably since the 
1970s. See infra notes 333-40 and accompanying text (discussing Haney's article). 
41. Delgado, Rotten Social Background, supra note 39, at 54. 
42. ld. at 55. 
43. ld. at 23-24. 
44. ld. at 24. 
45. ld. at 63-64. Three other categories of excusing conditions are when conduct is 
involuntary; when the conduct is voluntary, but the actor does not perceive its conse· 
quences; or when the conduct is voluntary but the actor does not see it as wrong. ld. (citing 
Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses: A Systematic Analysis, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 199, 
222 (1982». 
46. See Bazelon, Morality of the Criminal Law, supra note 20, at 401-02. 
47. ld. 
48. David L. Bazelon, The Morality of the Criminal Law: A Rejoinder to Professor 
Morse, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 1269, 1270 (1976) [hereinafter Ba.elon, Rejoinder). 
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its right to punish those who lack "a realistic chance to act in a 
socially acceptable way.,,49 
The idea of social forfeit is a variation on social contract theory. 
Under this theory, the legal system is part of a larger social con-
tract in which citizens agree to abide by the rules of the state as 
enforced by the government in return for safety and security. 50 
When individuals break this social contract, they gain an unfair 
advantage and must be punished.51 Conversely, when the rules of 
society are unjust, the social contract is broken, and citizens are 
no longer obliged to follow the rules.52 Under a Rawlsian interpre-
tation of social contract theory, rules are unjust when they would 
not be chosen by those in the original position, that is, under a 
veil of ignorance.53 In other words, Rawls envisions the rules that 
people would choose if they did not know their places in society, 
their social classes, their talents or abilities, or even their person-
al beliefs as to how they should lead their lives.54 This veil of igno-
rance ensures that parties in the original position will agree to 
principles that will protect those at the bottom of the social lad-
der.55 Rawls concludes that the resultant rules would guarantee 
equal opportunity as well as fair distribution of social and eco-
nomic resources, among other things. 56 Under social contract the-
ory, if unfair rules contribute to poverty and if society fails to 
remedy those disparities, then the poor are not bound to follow 
society's mandates. Accordingly, a poverty defense reinforces the 
rules of the social contract. 
As discussed in detail below, courts that use an RSB theory in 
the child neglect context take into account factors such as the 
parent's age and background, educational level, employment his-
tory, housing options, neighborhood environment, physical and 
mental health, and family and community support. In this ap-
proach, the poverty defense does more than excuse a parent who 
lacks money to purchase basic necessities such as diapers and 
food. Indeed, most child neglect cases are far more complicated, 
49. Delgado, Rotten Social Background, supra note 39, at 74. 
50. See Green, supra note 10, at 54. 
51. [d. at 55. 
52. Id. 
53. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 15-19 (1999). 
54. See id. at 17-18. 
55. See id. at 118. 
56. See id. at 266-67. 
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with families facing multiple barriers and deprivations. Further, 
courts that give the RSB approach a social forfeit gloss also con-
sider what actions the child welfare agency has taken to support 
the parents and how the parents have responded to any offered 
assistance. Consistent with Judge Bazelon's vision, the RSB ap-
proach in child neglect cases consists of a holistic examination of 
the family within its larger societal context. Nevertheless, as Ba-
zelon predicted, defendants rarely prevaiL 57 
2. Critics of RSB 
In the Alexander majority opinion, Judge Carl E. McGowan re-
jected the concept of an RSB defense, while acknowledging that 
"[t]he tragic and senseless events giving rise to these appeals are 
a recurring byproduct of a society which, unable as yet to elimi-
nate explosive racial tensions, appears equally paralyzed to deny 
easy access to guns.,,58 Although "[t]he ultimate responsibility for 
theD deaths reaches far beyond these appellants[,]" courts "ad-
minister a system of justice which is limited in its reach."s9 In 
short, current law "define[s] criminal accountability narrowly.,,60 
Like Judge Bazelon, Judge McGowan understood that poverty 
leads to crime, but he maintained a more constrained view of the 
court's role in administering justice. 
Similarly, several scholars have also argued that the RSB de-
fense should not be adopted because it does not fit within current 
conceptions of criminal justice. They make four main arguments 
against the RSB defense: (1) growing up with an RSB does not 
reduce individual responsibility for criminal acts; (2) an RSB de-
fense is practically impossible to apply; (3) an RSB defense can 
lessen public safety; and (4) the goals of the RSB defense are out-
side the bounds of the criminallaw.61 Stephen Morse has argued 
57. See Bazelon, Rejoinder, supra note 48, at 1271 (noting that mass acquittals based 
on an RSB defense are unlikely). 
58. United States v. Alexander, 471 F.2d 923, 965 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
61. See Angela P. Harris, Rotten Social Background and the Temper of the Times, 2 
ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 131, 138-41 (2011) (explaining that the defense has not been 
adopted because it conflicts with current cultural norms such as neoliberalism and the cul-
ture of crime control); Andrew E. Taslitz, The Rule of Criminal Law: Why Courts and Leg-
islatures Ignore Richard Delgado's Rotten Social Background, 2 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 
79, 121 (2011) ("[The RSB defense violates] basic precepts of mens rea, entity liability, 
moral culpability, and duty toward others that violate our whole sense of what defines 
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against recognizing an RSB defense on the grounds that the poor, 
like all people, are moral agents responsible for the decisions they 
make while acting within a world of constrained choices. 62 Unlike 
children or the insane, people from a RSB have ''basic knowledge 
of the rules and are capable of rational reflection ... because they 
have the general capacity to ... be guided by reason.,,63 Morse ex-
plains that if causation or determinism were an excuse to crime, 
no one would be responsible for their behavior, which is a result 
that society cannot tolerate.64 "No coherent, workable society can 
give legal permission to people to act according to their own pri-
vate or subjective moral code. This would abandon the rule of law 
and undermine social safety.,,65 Moreover, an RSB defense is both 
over- and under-inclusive because "many [RSB] sufferers do not 
suffer from [impaired behavioral controls] and many non-[RSB] 
sufferers may have such difficulties.,,66 As a result, "it seems pat-
ronizing and demeaning to claim that all victims of [RSB] are im-
paired human beings.,,67 
Second, opponents contend that the RSB defense is practically 
impossible to prove and apply. Professor Paul Robinson contends 
that while growing up under an RSB may shape individual be-
havior, the strength of the link between environment and crime is 
unclear. 68 Simply put, correlation is not causation. He states, 
"There is little empirical support for the proposition that a gener-
ally impoverished upbringing can itself cause a specific crime so 
as to render the offender blameless."69 For instance, the defendant 
in Alexander may have killed the Marine due to his own "selfish-
ness, arrogance, and pride," as much as due to an RSB.70 Third, 
American criminal law."); Jeremy Waldron, Why Indigence is Not a Justification, in FROM 
SOCIAL JUSTICE TO CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 10, at 98-99 (''The law ... is not about 
to recognize a class of defense whose general tendency ... would be to call into question 
the legitimacy of the general legal rules of property in a society."). These authors do not 
address the poverty defense in neglect cases. 
62. Stephen J. Morse, Deprivation and Desert, in FROM SOCIAL JUSTICE TO CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE, supra note 10, at 114, 149. 
63. Id. at 147. 
64. Id. at 149-50 
65. Morse, supra note 4, at 151. 
66. Id. at 150. 
67. Id. 
68. Paul H. Robinson, Are We Responsible for Who We Are? The Challenge for Crimi-
nal Law Theory in the Defenses of Coercive Indoctrination and ''Rotten Social Back-
ground," 2 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 53, 58 (2011). 
69. Id. at 59. 
70. Id. at 75. 
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opponents also query how the criminal justice system would han-
dle RSB defendants, many of whom might be dangerous if re-
leased and most of whom have harmed victims sharing RSBs.71 
Fourth, opponents view the RSB defense as an illegitimate 
means of advancing redistributive aims. 72 Morse argues that the 
purpose of the criminal law is to condemn and blame; it is not de-
signed to serve social welfare goals.73 Social redistribution should 
come from the political branches; not courts, and it is a 
"pipedream" to think that an RSB defense would transform socie-
ty.74 Moreover, he adds that most people in our democracy would 
not agree that society is so unjust as to compromise its legitima-
cy.75 Thus, he rejects social forfeit justifications, asking: "How is 
society to be put on trial so that juries understand that society is 
on trial and they are not simply hearing terribly sad stories of 
tragic life circumstances?"76 He points out that many law-abiding 
jurors may come from similarly disadvantaged backgrounds and 
thereby reject the defense. 77 In such cases, "[s]hould we abandon 
the defense, or should we keep trying at great expense fruitlessly 
to convict society?"78 In lieu of the RSB defense, Morse argues for 
criminal justice reforms that fit within traditional notions of the 
criminal law, but that would lessen the disproportionate impact 
of criminal law on poor people, such as decriminalizing low-level 
drug crimes and reforming draconian sentencing policies. 79 
71. See id. at 61. For a response to these and other arguments, see generally Morse, 
supra note 4. 
72. See Morse, Deprivation and Desert, supra note 62, at 115; see also Morse, supra 
note 4, at 148. 
73. Morse, supra note 62, at 115. 
74. Morse, supra note 4, at 158; see also William C. Heffernan, Social Justice 
ICriminal Justice, in FROM SOCIAL JUSTICE TO CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 10, at 47, 
55, 58 (arguing that it is inappropriate for judges to make decisions based on their concep· 
tions of social justice since there is no shared conception of social justice in the United 
States). 
75. Morse, supra note 62, at 153. 
76. Morse, supra note 4, at 157. 
77. [d. 
78. [d. 
79. See id. at 171-72. 
2013] THE POVERTY DEFENSE 507 
B. Coercion Defenses 
Some have also advocated for a poverty defense that mirrors 
existing defenses, such as necessity or duress. 8o These defenses 
exculpate an actor due to her blamelessness.8 ! A justification de-
fense, such as necessity, exculpates otherwise wrongful actions 
that benefit society, whereas an excuse defense, such as duress, 
renders an actor blameless, even if her actions have harmed soci-
ety.82 In other words, necessity approves the underlying offense; 
duress simply excuses it. 83 While the defenses differ in their spe-
cifics, they both reflect the idea that constrained choices can have 
coercive aspects that lessen a person's culpability. The poverty 
defense similarly acknowledges the coercive effects of deprivation. 
Under the necessity defense, a person commits what would 
otherwise be a crime due to a choice between two evils: he must 
violate the criminal law or someone will suffer a greater harm.84 
In such circumstances, "the law prefers that he avoid the greater 
evil by bringing about the lesser evil.,,85 Classic scenarios, for in-
stance, include those when a person kills one person in order to 
save two or more or when a firefighter destroys property to pre-
vent the spread of fire. 86 Courts have been reluctant to recognize 
economic hardship as creating conditions of necessity, reasoning 
that poor people usually have some alternatives other than com-
mitting a crime. 87 Thus, if Jean Valjean "could find temporary 
sustenance by, say, attending a soup kitchen, then Ohe is unlikely 
to be able to claim the defense" against a charge of stealing food. 88 
The necessity defense is a difficult standard to meet, and there 
80. See Antonia K. Fasanelli, Note, In Re Eichorn: The Long Awaited Implementation 
of the Necessity Defense in a Case of the Criminalization of Homelessness, 50 AM. U. L. 
REV. 323, 324--25 (2000); Smith, supra note 19, at 501. 
81. PAUL ROBINSON ET AL., CRIMINAL LAw DEFENSES § 25(a) (2011). 
82. Id. § 25(d). 
83. Smith, supra note 19, at 501. 
84. WAYNER. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAw § 10.1 (4th ed. 2003). 
85. [d. § 1O.1(a). The defense requires: (1) the defendant acted to avoid serious harm; 
(2) there were no adequate lawful means to escape the threatened harm; and (3) the harm 
avoided was greater than that caused by breaking the law. See id. §10.1. 
86. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 & cmt. 1. 
87. See infra note 89 and accompanying text. 
88. See Green, supra note 10, at 51. 
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are no reported cases in which a poor person was acquitted on 
economic grounds under the necessity defense. 89 
A defense of duress excuses a person who commits a crime be-
cause he is subject to such coercion that no reasonable person 
could be expected to resist. eo The rationale for excusing the 
wrongful conduct is that the defendant, facing the threat of harm, 
"somehow loses his mental capacity to commit the crime in ques-
tion.,,91 In such circumstances, "punishment serves neither the de-
terrent nor the condemnatory purposes of the criminal justice 
system.,,92 To argue duress, a defendant must establish a reason-
able fear of imminent harm.93 As with the defense of necessity, 
courts hold that economic hardship is not the sort of imminent 
harm that justifies crime.94 
For critics of a poverty defense, this is how it should be. They 
contend that deprivation alone does not satisfy the predicates for 
necessity or duress.95 Consider a person, such as Jean Valjean, 
who commits larceny because she is threatened with imminent 
death or starvation as a result of not being able to afford food or 
medicine. The argument against a necessity defense is that "min-
imal welfare and medical care is available to virtually anyone in 
the United States, and our law does not consider it objectively 
reasonable, for example, to steal to obtain better medical care or 
food than would be available through the welfare system.,,96 As for 
89. [d. Cases rejecting a necessity defense include: Harris v. State, 486 S.W.2d 573, 
574 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972) ("Economic necessity is no justification for a positive criminal 
offense."); State v. Moe, 24 P.2d 638, 640 (Wash. 1933) (ruling that hungry, unemployed 
people were guilty of larceny when they stole groceries) (,,[Elconomic necessity has never 
been accepted as a defense to a criminal charge. The reason is that, were it ever counte-
nanced, it would leave to the individual the right to take the law into his own hands."). Cf. 
Rex v. Holden, (1809) 168 Eng. Rep. 607 (K.B.) 607 (describing the trial, conviction, and 
execution of seven persons for creating forged bank notes) ("[T]hey were all indigent and, 
many of them very distressed persons, who were tempted to engage in this criminal prac· 
tice, by the necessities of the moment."). 
90. See LAFAVE, supra note 84, § 9.7. 
91. [d. § 9.7(a); see also ROBINSON, supra note 81, § 177(a); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 
cmt. 2 (1985). 
92. ROBINSON, supra note 81, § 177. 
93. LAFAVE, supra note 84, § 9.7(b). Several commentators assert that an excuse de· 
fense such as duress is a better fit than a necessity defense for poor defendants alleging 
that poverty lessens their criminal culpability. See Delgado, Rotten Social Background, 
supra note 39, at 49; Smith, supra note 19, at 501-02 (arguing that the duress defense 
does not require society to approve the underlying conduct, only to excuse it). 
94. ROBINSON, supra note 81, § 177(c)(b). 
95. See Morse, supra note 62, at 141-42. 
96. [d. at 142. 
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duress, a lack of economic opportunity is not a sufficient threat to 
compel crime. "A constrained choice ... is not the equivalent of no 
choice or a forced choice."97 
These critics may overstate the strength of our safety net, as at 
least one court has concluded. A California court has recognized 
that a necessity defense should be available in cases involving vi-
olations of anti-homeless ordinances.9a The Eichorn court held 
that a homeless person arrested for sleeping in public was enti-
tled to a necessity defense when there were no shelter beds avail-
able and economic forces were to blame for the defendant's home-
lessness.99 As the court stated, "[R]easonable minds could differ 
whether [the] defendant acted to prevent a 'significant evil.' Sleep 
is a physiological need, not an option for humans."loo Post-
Eichorn, California courts have rejected a necessity defense in 
cases involving poor defendants who commit violent crimes, rea-
soning that poverty does not "constitute a necessity [defense] jus-
tifying the commission of burglary" or armed robbery.lol Although 
the California courts supposedly remain open to considering the 
necessity defense for crimes of homelessness, there is no evidence 
that the defense has ever been used successfully.l02 By contrast, 
the poverty defense in child neglect cases has been applied far 
more often, and some courts have recognized that the effects of 
97. Id. at 143. 
98. In re Eichorn, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 535 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998). 
99. Id. at 540 (citing People v. Slack, 258 Cal. Rptr. 702, 705 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989». 
100. Id. at 539. Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
held that UlS Angeles violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual 
punishment when it forbade sitting, sleeping, or lying on the street at any time of day. 
Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 1138 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated as moot, 505 
F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2007) (granting joint motions to dismiss the appeal). The court rea· 
soned that the ordinance punished the status of homelessness, which can be involuntary 
and leaves the homeless with no choice but to sleep in public. Id. at 1136-37. 
101. People v. Carter, No. E049455, 2010 WL 5232940, at *8 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 23, 
2010) (distinguishing Eichorn from burglaries committed in the name of necessity); People 
v. Carrera, No. D03541O, 2001 WL 1356993, at *4-5 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 6, 2001) (fmding 
that public policy considerations do not support application of the necessity defense to jus-
tify armed robbery). 
102. See Elizabeth M. M. O'Connor, Note, The Cruel and Unusual Criminalization of 
Homelessness: Factoring Individual Accountability into the Proportionality Principle, 12 
TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 233, 260 (2007). Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has pointed out the limita-
tions of a necessity defense to crimes of homelessness, explaining that the practical reali-
ties of being homeless make it unlikely that defendants will have the knowledge or re-
sources to raise a necessity defense in court, and that even with counsel, defendants are 
likely to take a plea rather than to subject themselves to further pre-trial jail time. Jones, 
444 F.3d at 1130-31 (holding that the availability of a necessity defense does not deprive 
plaintiffs of standing to raise a constitutional challenge to anti-homeless legislation). 
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poverty sharply limit the options available to poor parents. loa 
These cases show how a coercion-based poverty defense might op-
erate in other contexts. 
II. POVERTY AND CHILD MALTREATMENT 
In the area of child neglect, the theoretical bases for a poverty 
defense have moved into practice. At least seven states recognize 
a poverty defense in criminal child neglect cases, while more than 
half the states recognize a poverty defense at some point in civil 
neglect cases.104 Civil child neglect cases are typically heard in 
family court and, if in the best interests of the child, the state can 
move for termination of parental rights; criminal child neglect 
cases can result in criminal penalties, such as incarceration. 105 
Parents can be subject to both types of proceedings simultaneous-
ly.lOG Cases interpreting the civil statutes are instructive because 
child neglect proceedings share many features with criminal law. 
The ultimate sanction for violating a civil child neglect law can be 
termination of the parent-child· relationship, which has been 
called the "civil death penalty.,,!07 Moreover, in these termination 
cases, which are usually brought and prosecuted by attorneys for 
the state,108 parents have a right to an attorney,109 and the Su-
103. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Dee, 110 N.E. 287, 288 (Mass. 1915) (arguing that 
hailing the indigent into criminal court because they are "unavoidably disabled" from 
providing support is a "grave injustice"); In re Daniels, 953 P.2d 1, 10--11 (Nev. 1998) 
(Springer, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that welfare proceedings rarely address the root cause 
of poverty leaving the parents unable to support their child despite their desire to do so); 
In re A.L.B., No. M2004-01808-COA-R3·PT, 2005 WL 1584065, at *14 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 
6, 2005) (explaining that poverty, without evidence of harm to the children, does not pro-
vide sufficient cause to separate children from their biological parents); Doria v. Tex. Dep't 
of Human Res., 747 S.W.2d 953,958 (Tex. App. 1988) (discussing the mother's endeavors 
to support her children despite her economic situation). 
104. See infra notes 179, 188 and accompanying text. 
105. See WILLIAM G. JONES, DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., WORKING WITH THE 
COURTS IN CHILD PROTECTION 37 (2006); Theresa Hughes, Discovering the Undiscoverable 
in Child Protective Proceedings: Safety Planning Conferences and the Abuse of the Right to 
Counsel, 10 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL'y 429, 433,471 (2006). 
106. See Hughes, supra note 105, at 471. 
107. In re K.A.w., 133 S.W.3d 1, 12 (Mo. 2004) (en bane) (referring to the termination 
of the parent-child relationship as "tantamount to a 'civil death penalty"'); In re P.C., 62 
S.W.3d 600, 603 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001); In re K.D.L., 58 P.3d 181, 186 (Nev. 2002); In re 
Smith, 601 N.E.2d 45,55 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991); In re N.R.C., 94 S.W.3d 799, 811 (Tex. Ct. 
App. 2002); see also In re J.J.Z., 630 A.2d 186, 191-92 (D.C. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that 
while neglect and criminal proceedings have different purposes, the protections for par-
ents and children are similar to those made available to criminal defendants). 
108. See Hughes, supra note 105, at 433 (describing role of child welfare agency in pur-
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preme Court of the United States has imposed a heightened 
"clear and convincing evidence" burden of proof. 110 For these rea-
sons, both civil and criminal child neglect cases discussing the 
poverty defense shed light on whether, when, and how poverty 
should excuse wrongful conduct. To appreciate the role that the 
poverty defense plays in family and criminal courts, it is critical 
to understand how child neglect correlates to poverty. In other 
words, why would society ever excuse neglectful parents? 
A. The Scope and Concept of Child Neglect 
In 2010, 436,321 children were found to be maltreated, of 
whom 78.3 percent suffered neglect.l11 Neglect far outranks other 
forms of child maltreatment, such as physical abuse (17.6 per-
cent), sexual abuse (9.2 percent), or psychological maltreatment 
(8.1 percent).l12 Under prevailing definitions, abuse results from 
an affirmative, intentional act, while neglect results from a par-
ent's failure to act. 1l3 Notably, the poverty defense is not available 
in child abuse cases, likely because child abuse is considered more 
volitional. 114 
The social service profession recognizes various forms of ne-
glect, the most common of which is physical neglect (including 
abandonment or lack of food, clothing, or hygiene).1l5 State legal 
suing dependency cases); see also David Michael Jaros, Unfettered Discretion: Criminal 
Orders of Protection and Their Impact on Parent Defendants, 85 IND. L.J. 1445, 1449 
(2010) (arguing that family court procedural protections should be utilized in criminal ne· 
glect proceedings). 
109. See Vivek S. Sankaran, Protecting a Parent's Right to Counsel in Child Welfare 
Cases, 28 CHILD L. PRAC. 97, 103 (2009) ("Although no federal statutory right to parent's 
counsel exists, fortunately most states have followed the Court's guidance and provide 
counsel to parents in dependency and termination proceedings."). Children are also ap· 
pointed an advocate. See Clare Huntington, Rights Myopia in Child Welfare, 53 UCLA L. 
REV. 637, 648 (2006). 
110. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 748 (1982). 
111. CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILD 
MALTREATMENT 7, 24 (2010) [hereinafter CHILD MALTREATMENT 2010). In the same year, 
there were approximately 3.6 million reports of child maltreatment, involving almost six 
million children. ld. at 20. 
112. ld. at 24. 
113. Peter J. McGovern, Redefining Child Neglect An American Perspective, 7 AM. J. 
FAM. L. 207, 212 (1993). 
114. See Dorothy Roberts, The Ethics of Punishing Indigent Parents, in FROM SOCIAL 
JUSTICE To CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 10, at 165. 
115. See DIANE DEPANFILIS, CHILDREN'S BUREAU, DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
CHILD NEGLECT: A GUIDE FOR PREVENTION, AsSESSMENT AND INTERVENTION 11-12 [here· 
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definitions of neglect in the civil context vary.116 Some definitions 
of neglect focus on the conduct of the parents; others focus on 
harm or a risk of harm to the child; while still others combine el-
ements of both. Regardless, because neglect is generally consid-
ered a failure to act, the child welfare system examines the cul-
pability of parents in assessing alleged deficiencies. ll7 Defining 
neglect is usually further complicated because there is no consen-
sus on the minimum requirements of caring for children or how 
certain actions and inactions affect the well-being of children.11s 
Furthermore, conceptions of neglect are culturally shaped,119 and 
societal expectations of parenting change over place and over 
time.120 One hundred years ago, many American children lived in 
unheated homes with dirt floors alongside insects and rodents, 
and these conditions were not considered unusual. Today, such 
conditions would likely trigger an investigation by child protec-
tive services. 
Despite this lack of definitional consensus, child welfare ex-
perts agree that neglect can harm children physically, intellectu-
ally, emotionally, and socially.12! The extent of these injuries de-
pends on a range of factors, such as the frequency, duration, and 
inafter CHILD NEGLECT GUIDE). Other forms of neglect include the following: medical ne-
glect (denial or delay in seeking health care), inadequate supervision (leaving child alone 
or exposing them to hazards), emotional neglect (inadequate affection, exposure to abuse, 
drug abuse by child), and educational neglect (truancy or failure to enroll). ld. at 11-14. 
116. ld. at 9. As a condition of receiving federal funds, states must incorporate the 
standards in the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act ("CAPTA"). 42 U.S.C. § 
5106(b) (2006). CAPTA sets the definitional floor for child abuse and neglect as "any re-
cent act or failure to act on the part of a parent or caretaker, which results in death, seri-
ous physical or emotional harm, sexual abuse or exploitation, or an act or failure to act 
which presents an imminent risk of serious harm." 42 U.S.C. § 5106(g). Above this floor, 
states can devise their own definitions. CHILD NEGLECT GUIDE, supra note 115, at 9. 
117. See CHILD NEGLECT GUIDE, supra note 115, at 9. 
118. ld. The definition of child neglect is widely perceived as vague and leaving too 
much discretion in the hands of decisionmakers. See Janet Weinstein & Ricardo Wein· 
stein, Before It's Too Late: Neuropsychological Consequences of Child Neglect and Their 
Implications for Law and Social Policy, 33 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 561, 565 (2000). 
119. See Laura Sullivan & Amy Walters, Incentives and Cultural Bias Fuel Foster Sys-
tem, NAT'L PUB. RADIO (Oct. 25, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/10/25/141662357/incen 
tives-and·cultural-bias-fuel-foster-system (describing how Native American children make 
up half of South Dakota's foster care population despite being less than fifteen percent of 
the population). Tribal leaders have told NPR that "what social workers call neglect, is 
often poverty; and sometimes native tradition." ld. 
120. See David Pimentel, Criminal Child Neglect and the "Free Range Kid':' Is Overpro-
tective Parenting the New Standard of Care? 2012 UTAH L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (de-
scribing changing norms of parenting). 
121. CHILD NEGLECT GUIDE, supra note 115, at 21. 
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severity of the neglect; the age and gender of the child; the rela-
tionship between the child and the caregiver; and the presence of 
protective factors, such as the resilience of the child. 122 In the 
worst case scenario, neglect can lead to death. In 2010, there were 
1560 child fatalities resulting from maltreatment, and 32.6 per-
cent of these fatalities resulted solely from neglect. 123 At the same 
time, removal of children from their homes has financial, emo-
tional, and social costS.124 
Society pays a cost for the consequences of neglect as well. Mil-
lions of dollars are spent annually on maintaining the child wel-
fare and juvenile justice systems, as well as on providing special 
education and physical and mental health care for maltreated 
children.125 Indirectly, society must contend with the consequenc-
es of abuse and neglect because maltreated children dispropor-
tionately commit crimes as juveniles; grow up to engage in adult 
criminal activity; and suffer higher rates of mental illness, sub-
stance abuse, and domestic violence. 126 The child welfare and ju-
venile offender populations overlap significantly.127 In short, ne-
glect has serious costs for children, families, and society. 
B. The Link Between Poverty and Child Neglect 
Although many poor families do not maltreat their children, 128 
poor people, and particularly poor mothers of color, are dispropor-
tionately involved with the child welfare system. 129 A state's level 
122. Id. 
123. CHILD MALTREATMENT 2010, supra note 111, at x. 
124. See infra note 372 and accompanying text (discussing the harms associated with 
foster care). 
125. CHILD NEGLECT GUIDE, supra note 115, at 27. Direct public expenditures for the 
child welfare system are estimated to be over $23 billion annually. See CYNTHIA ANDREWS 
SCARCELLA ET AL., THE COST OF PROTECTING VULNERABLE CHILDREN V: UNDERSTANDING 
STATE VARIATION IN CHILD WELFARE FINANCING 6 (2006), available at http://www.urban. 
orgfUploadedPDF/311314_ vulnerable_children. pdf. 
126. CHILD NEGLECT GUIDE, supra note 115, at 27. 
127. See Tamar R. Birckhead, Delinquent by Reason of Poverty, 38 WASH. U. J.L. & 
POL'y 53, 70-71 (2012). 
128. CHILD NEGLECT GUIDE, supra note 115, at 31. 
129. See DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE vi, 8 
(2002) [hereinafter ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS]; Cynthia R. Mabry, Second Chances: In-
suring that Poor Families Remain Intact by Minimizing Socioeconomic Ramifications of 
Poverty, 102 W. VA. L. REV. 607,615 (2000); Kristen Shook Slack et aI., Understanding the 
Risks of Child Neglect: An Exploration of Poverty and Parenting Characteristics, 9 CHILD 
MALTREATMENT 395, 396-97 (2004) (noting it has long been known that children from 
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of child well-being is statistically related to its poverty rate. 130 Ne-
glect in particular is more directly associated with poverty than 
other types of child maltreatment. 131 Recent studies show that the 
children of unemployed parents experience two to three times 
higher rates of neglect than children of employed parents. 132 
Moreover, children from very low-income families, that is, fami-
lies either with incomes of less than $15,000 a year or receiving 
public benefits, are seven times more likely to be neglected than 
children from other families. 133 Homelessness and receipt of public 
benefits such as welfare and Medicaid are also strongly associat-
ed with involvement in the child welfare system. 134 
Researchers are working to understand the relationship be-
tween poverty and neglect, although the complexity of the varia-
bles makes it difficult to isolate cause and effect.135 As a result, re-
searchers focus on risk factors within families that heighten the 
likelihood of neglect. 136 One explanation for the link between pov-
erty and neglect is that poor families are more involved with state 
agencies and thus more likely to be identified. 137 As a condition of 
poor families are overrepresented in the CPS); Roberts, supra note 114, at 163-64. 
130. See CHILD NEGLECT GUIDE, supra note l15, at 29; Christina Paxson & Jane Waldo 
fogel, Work, Welfare, and Child Maltreatment, 20 J. OF LAB. ECON. 435, 460 (2002) ("About 
half of families referred to CPS are receiving welfare at the time of the referral, and more 
than half have received welfare in the past."). 
131. See CHILD NEGLECT GUIDE, supra note 115, at 29. 
132. See ANDREA J. SEDLAK ET AL., FOURTH NATIONAL INCIDENCE STUDY OF CHILD 
ABUSE AND NEGLECT: REPORT TO CONGRESS 11 (2010), available at http://www.acf.hhs. 
gov/sites/defauWflies/opre/nis4_report30ngressjull_pdfjan2010.pdf. Data was derived 
from investigated cases reported by child protective services, as well as other community 
professionals who work with children and families. Id. at 2. 
133. Id. at 12. 
134. See Huntington, supra note 109, at 66~9. At the same time, receipt of WIC food 
support and food stamps lowered the risk of substantiated CAN reports, probably because 
they enhance economic security. See Bong Joo Lee et aI., Effects of WIC and Food Stamp 
Participation on Child Outcomes, USDA ERS REP. 27, 34-35 (Dec. 2006), available at 
http://digitalcorpora.org/corp/nps/fileslgovdocs 110 14/0 14721. pdf. 
135. Maria Cancian et aI., The Effect of Family Income on Risk of Child Maltreatment, 
Discussion Paper 1385-10 Inst. For Research on Poverty 1 (2010), http://www.irp.wisc. 
edulpublicationsldps/pdfs/dp138510.pdf. 
136. See JILL GOLDMAN ET AL., CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS., A COORDINATED RESPONSE TO CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: THE FOUNDATION FOR 
PRACTICE 27-34 (2003), available at http://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/usermanuals/found 
ationlfoundatione.cfm. 
137. See ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS, supra note 129, at 168-71; Diana Baumrind, 
The Social Context of Child Maltreatment, 43 FAM. REL. 360, 360 (1994); Daan Braveman 
& Sarah Ramsey, When Welfare Ends: Removing Children from the Home for Poverty 
Alone, 70 TEMP. L. REV. 447,461-62 (1997). 
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receiving public benefits, poor families are subject to intense 
scrutiny by the state, ranging from home visits to elaborate veri-
fication requirements to drug testing. l3s In addition, there is un· 
derreporting of maltreatment in middle- and upper-income 
households, where mandatory reporters are more likely to con-
clude that child injuries are accidental rather than intentional. l39 
Yet these class biases are not the entire explanation; rather, liv-
ing in a poor household appears to raise the risks of neglece4o-
although, as this article explains, many findings of "neglect" are 
really findings of poverty.14l 
Studies suggest five main reasons for why poverty is correlated 
with neglect. First, and most obvious, a lack of economic re-
sources can result in conditions-such as hung.er, inadequate 
housing, and homelessness-which are harmful to children. 142 No-
tably, the working poor struggle to maintain jobs despite obsta-
cles that can include irregular hours as well as a lack of transpor-
tation, child care, living wage, or health insurance. 143 In turn, 
these obstacles can result in neglect, particularly when children 
are left alone in the home. 144 Poor families also live in more dan-
gerous housing structures and neighborhoods, making the rate of 
accidental deaths far higher than for middle-class children.145 
Second, poverty causes stress, which in turn, can make it hard 
to parent effectively. "The stress of living in harsh, deprived con-
ditions can have a disabling effect on parenting capacities, result-
138. See Gilman, supra note 17, at 139l. 
139. See Braveman & Ramsey, supra note 137, at 462 & n.118. 
140. See Baumrind, supra note 137, at 360-61; Leroy H. Pelton, The Role of Material 
Factors in Child Abuse and Neglect, in PROTECTING CHILDREN FROM ABUSE AND NEGLECT 
132-33 (Gary B. Melton & Frank D. Barryeds., 1994). 
141. See Laura Frame, Parent-Child Relationships in Conditions of Urban Poverty: 
Protection, Care, and Neglect of Infants and Toddlers, Policy Brief, Center for Soc. Servs. 
Research 3-4 (Sept. 2001), http://cssr.berkeley.eduichildwelfare/pdfs/parent child. pdf. 
142. See Mabry, supra note 129, at 616; Cancian et al., supra note 135, at 3. 
143. See, e.g., Mabry, supra note 129, at 616; Patricia A Shin, Work and Family: Polio 
cies [or the Working Poor, 26 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 349, 349-51 (1989). 
144. See Mabry, supra note 129, at 611-12. There appears to be an association between 
a family's ability to purchase child care, as a result of workforce attachment, and lower 
rates of maltreatment. See Mark E. Courtney, Steven L. McMurtry & Andrew Zlnn, Hous-
ing Problems Experienced by Recipients o[ Child Welfare Services, 83 CHILD WELFARE 393, 
393-94 (2004); Cancian et al., supra note 135, at 1304. 
145. LEROY H. PELTON, FOR REASONS OF POVERTY: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE PUBLIC 
CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STA1'ES 146 (1989). Poor families face hazards 
such as increased rates of fires, broken stairs, frayed electrical wiring, lack of heat, ro-
dents, lead paint, and unsecured windows. Id. at 145--49. 
516 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:495 
ing in inconsistent discipline, failure to respond to a child's emo-
tional needs, or failure to prevent or address a potential risk to 
safety.,,146 Third, poverty compounds the vulnerability of low-
income parents and is related to increased levels of drug and al-
cohol abuse, as well as mental and physical illness.147 In turn, 
these disabling conditions can lead to neglect.148 Fourth, poor par-
ents are more likely to be isolated from support networks, such as 
relatives, neighbors, and religious and community groups.149 This 
isolation compounds the lack of economic resources, stress, and 
vulnerability of poor parents. 150 Fifth, there is an intergeneration-
al component to child neglect. "Parents who neglect often come 
from neglecting families; their parenting styles are learned be-
haviors, and they themselves might not have the capabilities to 
do much better than they are doing."151 Overlaying all these fac-
tors is the reality that poor parents lack the buffer that financial 
resources provide. For instance, there are middle-class parents 
who abuse drugs and alcohol and suffer from depression, but they 
have the economic wherewithal to seek professional help and to 
pay for child care to replace their own supervision. 152 In sum, pov-
erty is connected to neglect through a variety of mechanisms that 
both create and reinforce parenting challenges. The poverty de-
fense alone does not remove these challenges; at most, it places 
them into a broader context. 
C. Child Neglect Proceedings 
Civil cases involving child maltreatment are often called de-
pendency cases and, depending on the state, are heard in family 
146. Joy Duva & Sania Metzger, Addressing Poverty as a Major Risk Factor in Child 
Neglect: Promising Policy and Practice, 25 PROTECTING CHILD. 63, 65 (2010); see also 
ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS, supra note 129, at 164-65; Baumrind, supra note 137, at 
361; Pelton, supra note 140, at 151-53. 
147. Duva & Metzger, supra note 146, at 66. 
148. See GOLDMAN ET AL., supra note 136, at 28--29, 33. 
149. CHILD NEGLECT GUIDE, supra note 115, at 32. 
150. See id.; Baumrind, supra note 137, at 361-62. 
151. Weinstein & Weinstein, supra note 118, at 570 (arguing that child welfare system 
needs to provide services to children and not just parents because effects of neglect on 
children can be devastating to healthy brain development); see also Clare Huntington, Mu-
tual Dependency in Child Welfare, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1485, 1490 (2007) ("[Tlhe sys-
tem is self-perpetuating. Research has begun to show the intergenerational cycle of foster 
care."). 
152. Courtney et al., supra note 144, at 66. 
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or juvenile court. 153 The goal of the. civil child welfare system is 
protection of children. 154 Accordingly, when allegations of neglect 
are substantiated, the child welfare system will often respond to 
neglect by removing children from their parents, placing them in 
foster care, requiring the parents to comply with a case plan to 
lessen the risk of future maltreatment, and then determining 
what to do with the children long-term. 155 If the parents are una-
ble to comply with their case plan, and if the children have been 
in foster care for fifteen out of twenty-two months, the state will 
move for termination of parental rights. 156 Termination of paren-
tal rights permanently severs the legal relationship between par-
ent and child, and if the rights of both parents are terminated, 
the child may be considered available for adoption. 157 Before ter-
minating parental rights, courts must find, by clear and convinc-
ing evidence that the parent is unfit and that severing the par-
ent-child relationship is in the child's best interests. 15B This 
heightened standard of proof is imposed because parents have a 
fundamental liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment 
in the companionship, care, custody, and management of their 
children.159 This right is not absolute; the state also has a parens 
patriae interest in protecting children. 16o Reflecting on this pro-
153. See CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
UNDERSTANDING CHILD WELFARE AND THE COURTS (2011) [hereinafter UNDERSTANDING 
CHILD WELFARE], available at http://www.childweifare.gov/pubs/factsheets/cwandcourts. 
pdf; see also JAN MCCARTHY ET AL., A FAMILY'S GUIDE TO THE CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM 47-
52 (2003), available at http://www.cwla.org/childwelfare/fg.pdf; Annette R. Appell, Protect-
ing Children or Punishing Mothers: Gender, Race, and Class in the Child Protection Sys-
tem, 48 S.C. L. REV. 577,582 (1997). 
154. MCCARTHY ET AL., supra note 153, at 12. 
155. See Huntington, supra note 151, at 1490; Jessica E. Marcus, The Neglectful 
Parens Patriae: Using Child Protective Laws to Defend the Safety Net, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & 
SOC. CHANGE 255, 257 (2006). 
156. UNDERSTANDING CHILD WELFARE, supra note 153, at 3-4_ State processes can 
vary from this general framework, and they also have different terms for these various 
phases. ld. at 4. There are some exceptions to this mandate. See id. Parents can also con-
sent to voluntary termination of parental rights. See CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., GROUNDS FOR INVOLUNTARY TERMINATION OF PARENTAL 
RIGHTS 1-2 (2010) [hereinafter TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS], available at http:// 
childwelfare.gov/systemwidellaws-policieslstatutes!groundtermin. pdf. 
157. UNDERSTANDING CHILD WELFARE, supra note 153, at 4. 
158. See TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS, supra note 156, at 2. 
159. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982); see also Troxel v. Granville, 530 
U-B. 57, 66 (2000); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 
321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-45 (1925); Meyer v. 
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923). 
160. See generally Vivek S. Sankaran, Parens Patriae Run Amuck: The Child Welfare 
System's Disregard for the Constitutional Rights of Nonoffending Parents, 82 TEMP. L. 
518 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:495 
cess, one state supreme court justice described what he saw as 
the depressing sameness of child neglect cases that he saw: 
The pattern is familiar: Hungry children, dirty children, unkempt 
children, and improperly attended children come to the attention of 
welfare officials. The children are, without the parents' having the 
benefit of legal counsel, "temporarily" removed from their homes. 
The poor parents are forced into submitting to some kind of "plan" 
devised by welfare officials. Frequently, the poverty-stricken parents 
are not able to cope with the State's demands; and legal proceedings 
are instituted to deprive the poor parents of their children perma-
nently, and more importantly, to deprive the poor children of their 
parents. 161 
This is the civil framework within which the poverty defense 
operates. 
Child neglect can also be prosecuted criminally.162 As with civil 
statutes, states vary in how they define criminal neglect, which is 
often called child endangerment in the criminal context. 163 Juris-
dictions also vary in how vigorously they pursue criminal neglect 
charges. In New York City, for instance, prosecutors aggressively 
seek criminal protective orders against parents suspected of ne-
glect and charge parents with criminal neglect. 164 Other jurisdic-
tions prefer to leave neglect cases within the juvenile or family 
courts to avoid further traumatizing children or interfering with 
rehabilitative efforts. 165 The goals of criminal proceedings are os-
REV. 55, 59-64 (2009) (discussing common law development of the parens patriae doc-
trine). 
161. Kidwell v. Dep't of Human Res., Div. of Child & Family Servs., 953 P.2d 1, 10-11 
(Nev. 1998) (Springer, C.J., dissenting). 
162. The stages in this process are the same as other criminal proceedings, typically 
arrest and bail (or conditions of release), preliminary hearings, discovery, plea bargaining, 
and trial. See WILLIAM G. JONES, OFFICE ON CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT, WORKING WITH THE 
COURTS IN CHILD PROTECTION 41-43 (2006), available at http://www.childwelfare.gov/ 
pubs/usermanuals/courts/courts.pdf. Child neglect can also be prosecuted under criminal 
statutes of general applicability, such as assault statutes. See Roberts. supra note 11. at 
16l. 
163. See Eric C. Shedlosky, Comment, Protecting Children from the Harmful Behavior 
of Adults, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 299, 321-22 (2007) ("The various statutory ap-
proaches also differ according to the potential harm to a minor required to establish a vio-
lation and the degree of punishment dispensed to offenders."). 
164. See Jaros, supra note 108, at 1460-61. "The last two decades have witnessed an 
astonishing increase in the use of the criminal justice system to police neglectful parents." 
ld. at 1447. Jaros explains that this increase is due to the recasting of home as a public 
space through domestic violence cases, criminal law's propensity to expand into new sub-
stantive areas of law, and the broken windows approach to crime prevention and highly 
publicized failures of the civil child welfare system. ld. at 1461-62. 
165. JONES, supra note 162, at 41. Tragic cases of child neglect that result in death, 
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tensibly punishment and deterrence, while the goals of the child 
welfare system are protection of children and treatment for par-
ents. '66 However, this distinction may be overstated in the realm 
of child neglect. As Professor Douglas Besharov points out, "A 
criminal prosecution can provide important rehabilitative ser-
vices. Conversely, a civil child protection proceeding, which can 
involve the child's forced removal from the parents' custody and 
the parents' involuntary treatment, has indisputably punitive as-
pects.,,167 Moreover, for some parents, the civil penalty of termina-
tion of parental rights is worse than the criminal penalty of in-
carceration. In short, whether a neglect case is civil, criminal, or 
both is largely a matter of jurisdictional preferences. Regardless, 
the sanctions for parents under each regime can be severe. 
D. The Poverty Defense 
In 1915, at the height of the family preservation movement, a 
Massachusetts court was faced with deciding whether a mother 
should lose her three-year-old son because she was a pauper. 16B 
Unable to find work, the mother sought relieffrom the local over-
seer of the poor, who placed her and her children in the alms-
house. 169 This apparently led the state to claim that the child was 
neglected because his mother could not support him on her own. 170 
This was not an unusual situation. Poor, single mothers faced an 
especially high risk of involuntary child removal at this time be-
such as children accidentally left alone in locked cars, are often, but not always, criminally 
prosecuted. See Jennifer M. Collins, Crime and Parenthood: The Uneasy Case faY' Prosecut-
ing Negligent Parent.~, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 807, 808-09 (2006). Poor parents are prosecuted 
in negligent homicide cases at higher rates than middle and upper income parents. ld. at 
811 (arguing that parents who commit involuntary manslaughter should be prosecuted as 
prosecution serves deterrent and expressive effects). Her empirical study of cases of chil-
dren dying of hypothermia as a result of being left unatLended in a parent's care found 
that middle or upper class parents were prosecuted at a rate of 23.il%, while parents with 
lower socioeconomic status had prosecution rates of 85.7%. [d. at 831-32. "A multiple re-
gression analysis confirmed that socioeconomic status was an independently significant 
factor in prosecutorial decision making." ld. at 832. 
166. Meghan Scahill, Prosecuting Attorneys in Dependenc:,! Proceedings in Juvenile 
Court: Defining and Assessing a Critical Role in Child Abuse and Neglect Cases, 1 J_ 
CENTER FOR CHILD. & CTS. 73, 77 (1999). 
167. Douglas J. Besharov, Child Abuse: Arrest and Prosecution Decision-Making, 24 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 315. 318 (1986). 
168. Commonwealth v. Dee, 110 N.E. 287 (Mass. 1915). 
169. Td. 
170. ld. 
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cause they were deemed immoral. l7l The court rejected the state's 
argument. 172 The court reasoned that "the Legislature used the 
word [neglect] in the sense which imports some kind of culpability 
in the conduct of, or at least an intentional nonperformance of du-
ty by, the parent from whose custody the child is to be taken.,,173 
In this case, the mother was merely poor, but not undesirable or 
unfit.174 Thus, the court linked neglect-but not poverty-with pa-
rental culpability.175 As the court commented, "a grave injustice 
would be done to such innocent victims of poverty by bringing 
them into court with its stigma of criminality."176 Parental culpa-
bility remains a factor in child neglect case law. For the Massa-
chusetts court, at least, poverty and culpability were not co-
extensive. 177 
This reasoning appears to underlie the poverty defense con-
tained in the statutes of at least twenty-five states,178 as well as 
the District of Columbia, which consider economic hardship at 
some stage of dependency cases. 179 In many of these states, the 
definition of neglect that triggers removal excludes a failure to 
provide for a child's needs that is caused by financial hardship. As 
171. See MIMI ABRAMOVITZ, REGULATING THE LIVES OF WOMEN: SOCIAL WELFARE 
POLICY FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 168-69 (1988). 
172. Dee, 110 N.E. at 288. 
173. Id. "As early as 1887, the Massachusetts Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to 
Children stated ... that 'we never take neglected children by law from their parents, 
where then neglect arises from honest poverty alone.'" Pelton, supra note 145, at 1. 
174. Dee, 110 N.E. at 287. 
175. See id. at 288. 
176. Id. 
177. See id. 
178. Legislative history of these provisions is lacking; as one court stated: "Clear an-
swers to the [interpretation of the poverty defense] are not to be found, so far as we are 
aware, in the legislative history of the law or past opinions of this court." In re AH. 842 
A.2d 674, 687 (D.C. Ct. App. 2004). 
179. ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.014 (1998); ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-18-103(13)(A) (Supp. 
2011); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b·120(6) (West 2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 901(18) 
(Cum. Supp. 2010); D.C. CODE § 16-2301(9)(A)(ii) (Supp. 2012); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 
39.01(32)(t) (West 2012); IOWA CODE § 232.68(2)(4)(a) (2011); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38.2202(t) 
(2011); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 625.090(3)(t) (LexisNexis Cum. Supp. 2012); LA. CHILD. 
CODE ANN. art. 603(16) (2012); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260C.301(b)(2) (West 2012); MONT. 
CODE ANN. § 41·3·102(21)(a)(4) (2009); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43·292(3) (2009); N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 169·C:3(XIX) (Cum. Supp. 2012); N.J. REV. STAT. § 9:6·8.21(c)(4)(a) (2012); 
N.Y. SOC. SERVo LAw § 371(4-a) (Consol. 2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-111l(a)(3) (2011); 
N.D. CENT. CODE § 27·20·02(8) (2011); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6303(b)(2) (West 2010); 
R.I. GEN. LAws § 40·11·2(1)(iv) (2011); S.C. CODE ANN. § 63·7·20(4)(c) (2010); TEX. FAM. 
CODE ANN. § 261.001(4)(b)(iii) (West 2012); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.020(14) (West 
2012); W. VA. CODl;: ANN. § 49·}·3(11) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 
48.02(12g) (West 2011); 110 MAss. CODE REGS. 2.00 (2012). 
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an example, the District of Columbia defines a neglected child as 
one who does not experience "proper parental care or control, 
subsistence, education as required by law, or other care or con-
trol necessary for his ... health, and the deprivation is not due to 
the lack of financial means of' the parent or custodian. ISO Alterna-
tively, some states recognize the poverty defense as a matter of 
common law. For instance, the Georgia courts have stated that 
"[w]hile the state may not sit blindly idle as a child suffers uncon-
scionable hardship, neither may it blithely intercede simply be-
cause the child's lot is substandard."181 
Other state statutes excuse poverty-related child neglect only 
after considering whether the state has offered services to poor 
parents and how the parents have responded. 1s2 Florida's statue is 
an example of this approach, providing that it "shall not be con-
sidered neglect if [failure to provide for the child is] caused pri-
marily by financial inability unless actual services for relief have 
been offered to and rejected [by the parentj."IRa The National Child 
Abuse and Neglect Data System, a federally funded national data 
collection effort, similarly defines neglect as "the failure by the 
caregiver to provide needed, age-appropriate care although finan-
cially able to do so or offered financial or other means to do SO."184 
These statutes oblige both the state and parents to improve a 
180. D.C. CODE § 16-2301(9)(A)(ii) (Supp. 2012) (emphasis added). 
181. R.C.N. v. Georgia, 233 S.E.2d 866. 867 (Ga. Ct. App. 1977); cf. In re J.E., 711 
S.E.2d 5, 15-16 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011) (Dillard, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for 
terminating parental rights on the basis of the mother's poverty). 
182. The Model Juvenile Court Act and federal law also exclude poverty from neglect. 
See UNIF. MODEL JUVENILE CT. ACT § 47 (1968); 45 C.F.R. § 1340.2(d) (1990). 
183. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.01(44) (West 2012); see also ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-
303(36)(A)(ii) (2011) ("and no services for relief have been offered"); IOWA CODE § 232.68 
(2011) ("or when offered financial or other reasonable means to do so"); MONT. CODE ANN. 
§ 41·3-102(21)(a)(iv) (2009) ("or offered financial or other reasonable means to do so"); N.J. 
REV. STAT. § 9:6-8.21 (2002) ("or though offered financial or other reasonable means to do 
so"); N.Y. SOc. SERVo LAw § 371(4-a)(i)(A) (ConsoL 2011) ("or offered financial or other rea-
sonable means to do so"); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-2(1)(iv) (2006) ("or offered financial or 
other reasonable means to do so"); S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-20(4)(c) (1976) ("or offered finan-
cial or other reasonable means to do so"); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 261.001(40(B)(iii) (West 
2011) ("unless relief services had been offered and refused"). 
184. See PETER J. PECORA ET AL., THE CHILD WELFARE CHALLENGE 126 (2010). 
NCANDS notes that reporting is impacted by state definitions: "Wben conducting anal-
yses with NCANDS data, it is important to keep in mind that state-to-state variation in 
child maltreatment laws and information systems may affect the interpretation of the da-
ta." See NAT'L CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT DATA SYS., http://aspe.hhs.govihsp/06/catalog-ai-
an-naiNCANDS.htm (last visited Dec. 10, 2012). 
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family's economic situation before parental rights are terminat-
ed. 185 
At least four states do not consider poverty in their definitions 
of neglect, but they do exclude poverty as a ground for termina-
tion of parental rights. 186 This means that children can be re-
moved from their homes for poverty-related neglect, but the par-
ents' rights cannot subsequently be terminated on this basis. 
Kentucky is an example of this approach; there, it is grounds for 
termination if "the parent, for reasons other than poverty alone, 
has continuously or repeatedly failed to provide or is incapable of 
providing essential food, clothing, shelter, medical care, or educa-
tion reasonably necessary and available for the child's well-
being.,,187 The poverty defense is less common in the criminal con-
text; it is recognized in seven states, including New York. 188 In 
short, about half the states recognize a poverty defense in civil 
proceedings, while a handful permit the defense in criminal cas-
189 
es. 
It should be noted that in both the civil and criminal contexts, 
the "poverty defense" is not technically a separate defense. Be-
cause it is part of the definition of child neglect, a parent arguing 
185. A related poverty defense arises in child support contempt cases; this is not sur-
prising as failure to pay child support is a form of economic neglect. See Elizabeth G. Pat-
terson, Civil Contempt and the Indigent Child Support Obligor: The Silent Return of Debt-
or's Prison, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'y 95, 125-26 (2008) (discussing the "defense of 
inability to pay"). When parents fail to pay child support, they can be charged with con-
tempt; however, incarceration is not supposed to be imposed if the contemnor lacks the 
ability to pay arrears. See id. at 102, 104. Yet, as Patterson explains, the reality is that 
indigent parents are regularly incarcerated, due to a lack of procedural protections for liti-
gants. See id. at 116-25. In other words, the poverty defense in child support enforcement 
cases is usually a failure, with dismal consequences for families and society. Id. at 126. 
186. See infra note 187. 
187. K.Y. REV. STAT. ANN. § 625.090(2)(g) (LexisNexis Cum. Supp. 2012). Similar stat-
utes are found in Minnesota, North Carolina, and Nebraska. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 
260C.301 (West 2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-ll11(a) (2007); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-292 
(2009). 
188. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 615 (1999); D.C. CODE § 22-1102 (2012); FLA. STAT. 
ANN. § 827.03 (West 2003) (amended 2012); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAw § 3-602.1 (West 
2011); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.42.020 (West 2006); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8D-4 (Lex-
isNexis 1996); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 948.21 (West 2011). 
189. There are states that affirmatively reject a poverty defense. For instance, in Vir-
ginia, courts have ruled that poverty is irrelevant to determining neglect. City of Campbell 
v. Woodruff, 2004 WL 3391872, at *7 (Va. App. Oct 12, 2004). Further, in at least three 
states, statutes provide that homelessness is a ground for removal, thus equating poverty 
with neglect. COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3·102 (2009); 720 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 13011 (West 
1993); S.D. CODIFIED LAwS § 26-8A-2 (2009). Ohio includes homelessness in its dependen-
cy definition. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.04 (LexisNexis 1996). 
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poverty is making a failure of proof defense, or "negation of an el-
ement required by the definition of the offense.,,19o However, the 
reality is that in proving child neglect, states are not required to 
prove a parent's availability of financial resources as part of their 
prima facie case .. Instead, the parents have to raise poverty in 
their own defense. 191 Based on available written decisions, many 
parents do raise the poverty defense, sometimes successfully.192 
Nevertheless, each year, thousands of children are removed from 
their parents for conditions caused by poverty. Indeed, "inade-
quacy of income, more than any factor, constitutes the reason that 
children are removed."193 
III. THE POVERTY DEFENSE: THEORY IN PRACTICE 
Cases that interpret the child neglect poverty defense reflect 
the various theories that scholars have put forward to justify a 
broad-based poverty defense for all criminal cases. Accordingly, 
we can consider these theories in a real-life setting to consider 
how a poverty defense might operate in other contexts. There are 
sharp disagreements on the proper balance between parents' 
rights and children's rights in child welfare law. 194 Despite these 
debates, there is near unanimity that most children who are re-
moved from their parents are poor. 195 This section examines writ-
ten decisions that consider the poverty defense; most of them 
arise in the civil context of termination of parental rights. 198 As 
this section demonstrates, the poverty defense rarely succeeds 
unless the court has a nuanced understanding of how poverty is 
related to neglect, which in turn is sometimes influenced by a 
judge's personal ideology. 
190. Robinson, supra note 45, at 204. 
191. See, e.g., Wright v. Florida, 409 So. 2d 1183, 1185 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) ("[T)he 
burden is on the parent ... to come forward with evidence that the condition was una-
voidable because of poverty."). 
192. See, e.g., In re AS.C., 671 A2d 942,947-48 (D.C. 1996). 
193. ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS, supra note 129, at 35. 
194. Huntington, supra note 109, at 638 (arguing against a rights based model in child 
welfare). 
195. See supra text accompanying notes 128-52 (discussing the connection between 
poverty and neglect). 
196. E.g., In re A.H., 842 A2d 674, 686-87 (D.C. Ct. App. 2004). There are far fewer 
reported criminal cases involving the poverty defense, probably because the defense is less 
common in the criminal context; most criminal cases result in plea bargaining; and par-
ents may lack the resources to appeal adverse decisions. 
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A. The Poverty Defense as an Excuse of Coercion 
In many decisions that consider the poverty defense, courts ad-
dress the present economic circumstances of the parents, but do 
not delve into the parents' personal backgrounds or psychological 
histories as explanations for the alleged neglect. 197 Thus, the de-
fense most often resembles a coercion defense rather than an RSB 
defense. The precise terminology of the statutory poverty defense 
does not seem to make a difference in the courts' analyses. Stat-
utes containing the poverty defense use varying terms, such as 
"poverty" or "lack of financial means[;]" however, the statutes do 
not define these terms, and courts use them interchangeably.19B 
So what does poverty mean? Poverty is a relative concept influ-
enced by time and place,199 but it generally refers to economic 
deprivation.2OO While the official poverty line set by the federal 
government measures who is poor, it does not define what it 
means to be poor. According to the most recent data, the poverty 
line is $23,021 for a family offour.201 Based on this measurement, 
minorities and female-headed families are disproportionately 
poor, and growing up poor is associated with higher poverty rates 
as an adult.202 At any given time, more than half of all poor people 
are in a long-term poverty spell of ten years or more. 203 "While 
poverty in general refers to material deprivation, it is a multi-
faceted experience with many different effects on those who are 
struggling to get by."zo4 These effects are apparent in the child ne-
glect case law, which is rife with stories of families facing difficul-
ty paying bills and affording rent, food, and clothes; living in sub-
standard housing; lacking medical care; suffering with mental 
health problems; wrestling with substance abuse problems; and 
197. See, e.g., id.; MP v. Wyoming ex rei. CP, 965 P.2d 1155, 1158 (Wyo. 1998). 
198. Compare In re A. H., 842 A2d at 686--87 (citing D.C. CODE § 16·2301(9)(15) (Supp. 
2000», with V.S. v. Kentucky, 194 S.W.3d 331, 335 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006) (citing Ky. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 625.090(2)(g) (LexisNexis 1998». 
199. See JOHN ICELAND, POVERTY IN AMERICA 10 (2d ed. 2006). 
200. Id. at 21. 
201. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POVERTY THRESHOWS (2011), available at http://www.cen 
sus.govlhhes/www/poverty/datalthreshldlindex.html. 
202. See ICELAND, supra note 199, at 41, 51,68. 
203. Id. at 49. 
204. Id. at 144. 
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living in neighborhoods with high rates of crime.205 Many written 
opinions involve neglect caused by poverty-induced stress. 206 
When courts consider a multi-faceted view of poverty, the pov-
erty defense can be successful in keeping families intact. 207 For in-
stance, in In re S.M. W,208 the state sought to terminate the pa-
rental rights of a single mother of four children, all born before 
she was twenty-one.209 At the time of the abuse report triggering 
the child welfare investigation, the mother was incarcerated for 
theft, burglary, and marijuana possession, and the children were 
in the care of her family members.21o However, the family mem-
bers soon relinquished the children to the state because they were 
unable to afford their care.211 When the mother was released from 
incarceration, the children remained in foster care, and the state 
developed a series of case plans in order to reunify the family.212 
These plans required the mother to support her children's foster 
care placements, visit her children, complete parenting classes, 
secure stable employment and adequate housing, submit to peri-
odic psychiatric evaluations and counseling, and comply with the 
conditions of her probation.213 The child welfare department even-
tually decided to seek termination of the mother's parental rights, 
charging that she failed to comply with the case plans. 214 
The appellate court rejected the state's arguments, concluding 
that the mother diligently worked to comply with her case plans, 
while the department offered the mother only "nebulous case 
plans, vacillating goals and misdirected assistance" as well as 
205. See, e.g., Watson v. Div. of Family Servs., 813 A.2d llOl, 1103 (Del. 2002). 
206. See, e.g., id.; In ,.e Mack, 2000 WL 681648, at *1-*2 (Ohio Ct. App. May 26,2000). 
Dorothy Roberts defines neglect caused by poverty.induced stress as a "crime caused by 
poverty," while financial inability to provide for children is a "crime defined by poverty." 
Roberts, supra note ll6, at 172. It is likely that cases involving a failure to provide are 
resolved at the agency level or at an earlier stage of the process than the termination of 
parental rights, and thus not reflected in appellate decisions. 
207. Janet L. Wallace & Lisa R. Pruitt, Judging Pa,.ents, Judging Place: Poverty, Ru-
rality, and Te,.mination of Parental Rights, 77 Mo. L. REV. 95, 142 (2012) ("Doing justice 
for rural families also may require an understanding of cultural differences and of the par-
ticular spatial and social challenges these families face."). 
208. 771 So. 2d 160 (La. Ct. App. 2000). 
209. [d. at 163. 
210. Id. 
211. Id. 
212. [d. at 164, 166. 
213. [d. at 166-67. 
214. [d. at 167, 169, 171-72. 
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denying her support in obtaining housing or employment. 215 The 
court commented on the catch-22 facing the mother as the de-
partment imposed "antithetical requirements.,,216 When the moth-
er worked multiple jobs to secure an adequate income, depart-
ment workers found her supervision of her children lacking.217 
When she cut back on her work hours to spend more time with 
her children, she had to move to a smaller home, which led the 
workers to deem her living situation unstable. 218 The court recog-
nized that in the low-wage labor market and with a dearth of af-
fordable housing, a parent's choice is between more work or less 
comfortable living conditions.219 In its decision, the court com-
mended the mother for her persistence despite these odds and 
commented bitterly, "[W]hile the Department is powerless to 
mandate the sterilization of poor, uneducated single women, its 
insidious plan of terminating the parental rights of these women, 
largely because of their financial, educational and marital status, 
compels essentially the same result.,,22D The court thus viewed 
child neglect as rooted in poverty, and poverty as rooted in struc-
tural causes with multi-faceted effects.221 The family was reunit-
d 222 e . 
The idea that poverty is not a crime is also occasionally reflect-
ed in criminal child neglect case law. In State v. Chavez, the court 
considered whether a filthy home environment was enough to 
support a child endangerment conviction.223 There, an infant child 
died when she was put to sleep in a dresser drawer and apparent-
ly suffocated on the bedding in the drawer. 224 The father was 
charged with child endangerment with respect to the infant and 
215. Id. at 167, 169, 175. 
216. Id. at 170; see also S.K. v. Madison Cnty. Dep't of Human Res., 990 So. 2d 887, 903 
(Ala. Civ. App. 2008) (noting that a father should not be penalized for working too hard 
and that the state had put him in a catch-22 because if he were not working the state 
would fault him for lack of employment stability). 
217. In re S.M. w., 771 So. 2d at 169. 
218. Id. at 169-70. 
219. See id. at 170. 
220. Id. at 168; see also Doria v. Tex. Dep't of Human Res., 747 S.W.2d 953, 958 (Tex. 
App. 1988). In that case, the appellate court reversed a termination order, stating that the 
mother had made significant improvements under her case plan, which were "difficult 
milestones considering appellant's economic situation." Id. 
221. See In re S.M. w., 771 So. 2d. at 170. 
222. See id. at 175. 
223. 211 P.3d 891, 893 (N.M. 2009). 
224. Id. 
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her two older brothers.225 The evidence at trial showed that the 
house was unsanitary, was filled with rodent droppings, had a 
lack of gas or hot water, had piles of dirty clothes, and had glass 
and rusty nails in the yard. 226 At the same time, the surviving 
children were physically healthy and well-nourished, and there 
was no evidence of drugs or alcohol in the home. 227 The father was 
convicted of child abuse by endangerment and argued on appeal 
that the home's conditions were caused by poverty and did not 
endanger his children.228 The court agreed, finding that the state 
failed to provide evidence of a connection between the home's 
conditions and "a substantial and foreseeable risk of harm.,,229 The 
court noted that the family had been investigated by the New 
Mexico Children, Youth, and Families Department, but the civil 
child welfare system had not taken any further action. 230 The 
court strongly suggested that the use of the civil process would be 
more appropriate, as "this is a case where the family struggled 
with poverty, and our ultimate goal should be to assist, rather 
than to punish, that status.,,231 This approach severs poverty from 
culpability. 
By contrast, most courts in child neglect cases generally take a 
narrower view of poverty, which allows them to easily find non-
economic-that is, behavioral-grounds for terminating parental 
rights. 232 For instance, in Division of Youth & Family Services v. 
225. ld. 
226. ld. at 894. 
227. !d. 
228. ld. at 895. 
229. ld. at 90l. 
230. ld. at 901-02. 
231. ld. A similar analysis was made by the dissenting judge in Commonwealth v. 
O'Conner which the majority upheld a first-degree criminal abuse charge against a father 
who locked his children in their rooms on a hot day while he napped, the children were 
found with urine soaked clothes, and a three·year old had eaten his own feces. 372 S.W.3d 
855, 856-58 (Ky. 2012). The dissenting judge stated that the case should have been han· 
dIed as a civil action for neglect and commented that given the father's fifteen·year sen· 
tence, state taxpayers may spend up to almost half a million dollars to incarcerate some· 
one who is guilty only of "poor parental judgment and keeping a filthy house." ld. at 862-
63 (Scott, J., dissenting). 
232. See, e.g., In re AAM.B., 62 So. 3d 813, 814, 816 (La. Ct. App. 2011) (terminating a 
father's parental rights not because he was poor, but because he failed to comply with case 
plan requirements); In re RL.T., No. COAn·163. 2011 WL 2848793 (N.C. App. July 19, 
2011) (removing children because of father's substance abuse, not due to poverty); A.L.M. 
v. AM., No. E049686, 2010 WL 2769805, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. July 14, 2010) (terminating 
parental rights not due to poverty. but for risk of neglect) ("[p]overty placed the children at 
risk for neglect and Mother showed little interest in protecting her children from that risk 
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K.c., New Jersey Child Protective Services removed children 
from their home due to extreme filthiness.233 The trial court found 
that the house was crawling with roaches, was littered with trash 
bags, smelled of urine and feces, and contained a bucket of urine 
in a bedroom.234 Nevertheless, a medical exam revealed the chil-
dren had no major medical problems.235 The trial judge terminat-
ed the mother's parental rights focusing on the mother's conduct 
and divorcing it from her income leve1. 236 The judge stated, "[y]ou 
do not have to be rich, you don't have to earn a lot of money to 
keep a clean house and this was not just a dirty house ... , [t]his 
was a disgusting, deplorable, filthy, dangerous condition.,,237 The 
appellate court agreed with this reasoning, concluding that the 
case did not hinge on poverty but rather on "an apparent indiffer-
ence to the potential harm that such filthy conditions could cre-
ate."238 Thus, the court linked the filthy conditions solely to paren-
tal culpability, rather than to any environmental or structural 
factors linked to poverty. 
From the decision, it is hard to know whether termination was 
warranted in the K.C. case, that is, whether it was in the chil-
dren's best interests. Nevertheless, in focusing solely on the 
of neglect."); D.N. v. State, No. 49A04-0910-JV·597, 2010 WL 2020290, at *9 (Ind. Ct. App. 
May 21, 2010) (finding termination not based on poverty but father's ''lack of initiative"); 
In re M.N.N.G., No. COA09-697, 2009 WL 3353014, at *2, *5 (N.C. Ct. App. Oct. 20, 2009) 
(holding that mother's rights were not terminated due to poverty, but because she turned 
down housing and continued an abusive relationship); D.J. v. Marion Cnty. Dep't of Child 
Servs., No. 49A05-0803·JV-180, 2008 WL 4149822, at *8 (Ind. Ct. App. Sept. 10, 2008) 
(removing children not for poverty but because home was unsanitary and cluttered); AR. 
v. Marion Cnty. Dep't of Child Servs., No. 49A02·0604·JV·360, 2007 WL 582876, at *9 
(Ind. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2007) ("We agree that poverty alone does not show unfitness. That 
does not mean, however, that poverty which causes a parent to neglect a child or expose 
the child to danger cannot be considered by a trial court in determining whether to termi-
nate parental rights."); Michael M.S. v. Kathy S., Nos. 99-2384, 99-2385, 1999 WL 
1221230, at *6 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 21, 1999) (terminating parental rights not due to pov-
erty, but due to "personal choice and responsibility"); In re R.M., 431 N.W.2d 196, 199 (10, 
wa Ct. App. 1988) ("Economic considerations were not paramount. Stability and control of 
her behavior and responsibility for her children were more clearly at issue."); V.S. v. 
Commonwealth, 706 S.W.2d 420, 424 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986) ("This is more than just a pov-
erty case."). 
233. 2006 WL 3328348 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Nov. 17,2006). 
234. Id. at *2. 
235. Id. 
236. Id. at *3-4. 
237. Id. at *3. 
238. Id. at *5; see also Wisconsin v. Lynn Co., 268 Wis. 2d 847, *2 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003) 
("[C]leanliness is a matter of effort, not poverty."); N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. 
S.A., No. A-2499-07T4, 2009 WL 77969, *5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 14, 2009) (find-
ing that poverty is not an excuse for a dirty home). 
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mother's conduct, the trial and appellate courts failed to consider 
the proven link between poor housing conditions and poverty. For 
instance, it is possible that the family was using a bucket as a toi-
let because the plumbing was not working, because they could not 
afford a plumber, or because a landlord refused to make needed 
repairs. Moreover, the court never addressed the state's apparent 
failure to provide the mother with any services, resources, or 
equipment to help her clean the home, even though federal law 
requires that states make "reasonable efforts" to support family 
reunification,239 and even though cleanliness is a far cheaper fIx 
than many deep-rooted problems facing poor families, such as 
homelessness or mental illness. 240 Instead, the court took a nar-
row view of poverty, while assuming that the mother had a broad 
range of voluntary choices in shaping her own conduct.241 Thus, 
the mother could not satisfy the poverty defense in its necessity 
or duress form. 242 
This approach abounds in the case law.243 Many courts focus in-
tensely on parenting deficiencies, ignoring the economic hardship 
facing families in the child welfare system and lacking under-
standing of how structural inequalities impact poor families. An-
other particularly common proxy for poverty is rurality, as many 
courts fail to recognize the spatial and fiscal obstacles facing ru-
ral parents.244 Other euphemisms for poverty include immaturity, 
nonchalance, poor decision-making, inattentiveness, instability, 
and the like.245 The courts criticize parents who deemed seeking 
239. See generally Kathleen S. Bean, Reasonable Efforts: What State Courts Think, 36 
U. TOL. L. REV. 321 (2005) (assessing how courts have interpreted the reasonable efforts 
requirement). 
240. One dissenting judge in a termination case commented that if the mother had 
been wealthier, "she could hire a cleaning service." In re N.M.W., 461 N.W.2d 478, 483 
(low a Ct. App. 1990) (Sackett, J., dissenting). In fact, if the state had hired a cleaning ser-
vice for the family, it 
Id. 
would have cost the state less than the judicial time and court appointed at-
torney fees spent to litigate the adequacy of this woman's housekeeping skills 
through the state's appellate courts. And most importantly, the child would 
not have suffered the trauma of removal and the insecurities that come in 
foster care. 
241. See K. C., 2006 WL 3328348, at *3-5. 
242. Id. at *4-5. 
243. See generally id.; Wallace & Pruitt, supra note 207, at 114. 
244. See Wallace & Pruitt, supra note 207, at 99, 117. 
245. See Daniels v. Dep't of Human Res., 953 P.2d 1, 10 (Nev. 1998) (Springer, C.J., 
dissenting) (arguing that courts are taking poor children for reasons of poverty but calling 
poverty by other names). 
530 UNNERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:495 
state aid "not worth the effort,,,246 who "displayed no motivation to 
be a parent,"247 and who refused "to take advantage of the oppor-
tunities available to her for her children.,,248 
Due to a range of disabling conditions, some of these parents 
may be unable to parent at acceptable, safe levels no matter how 
much support the state provides. Yet some of the unflattering 
qualities described above stem from the stresses and realities of 
living in extreme poverty while trying to meet escalating state 
demands. It is difficult to know, however, because courts general-
ly do not explore the larger community, demographic, or social 
context surrounding the family. As one dissenting judge stated, 
"[P]arents are almost always required to submit to demeaning, 
and often unproductive, 'counseling,' 'parent training,' and 'family 
therapy[;]' however, the results are "almost always the same[,] 
the parents remain poor; their poverty cannot be 'counseled' 
away.,,249 Moreover, while child prevention services often include 
various forms of counseling, they rarely provide parents with ser-
vices designed to increase their economic well_being.250 In other 
words, parents are typically ordered not to be poor, that is, to ob· 
tain a job and housing, but they receive inadequate assistance to 
meet that goal. 
B. The Poverty Defense as RSB 
In child neglect cases in which courts examine the parents' im-
poverished backgrounds as part of the analysis, the poverty de-
fense resembles an RSB defense. An RSB-style defense has been 
successful when courts view intergenerational poverty as the 
primary barrier facing the family. For instance, in In re A.L.B.,251 
246. In re M.B., 288 N.W. 2d 773, 775 (S.D. 1980). 
247. In re C.L.B., No. C5·88·1016, 1989 WL 460, at *1 (Minn. App. Jan. 10, 1989). 
248. In re Bell, 421 S.E.2d 590, 592 (N.C. Ct. App.). The dissenting judge in the case 
found no evidence of neglect, and even the attorney for the child welfare agency conceded 
at the hearing, "we would certainly admit that this is not one of the worse neglect cases 
that we have ever brought, it is a marginal case--its [sic] a case where the mother has 
worked with Social Services to some extent to try [to] improve conditions in the home." Id. 
at 594 (Hendrick, C.J., dissenting). 
249. Daniels, 953 P.2d at 12. 
250. See Mary Keegan Eamon & Sandra Kopels, 'For Reasons of Poverty:' Court Chal-
lenges to Child Welfare Practices and Mandated Programs, 26 CHILD. & YOUTH SERVS. 
REV. 821, 823 (2004). 
251. No. M2004·01808-COA·R3-PT, 2005 WL 1584065, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 6, 
2005). 
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the state removed three children from their home due to "the ex-
treme poverty of the family, very little food in the house, dog feces 
on the floors, and general filth and clutter everywhere.,,252 While 
the children were in foster care, the parents struggled to obtain 
stable housing; they moved from an apartment to public housing, 
were evicted, lived with their preacher, rented a house, and 
moved in with family members.253 In light of the filth and unsta-
ble living conditions, the trial judge terminated parental rights. 254 
The appellate court reversed, concluding, "We are dealing with 
an unbelievably poor family with two generations of unsanitary 
and messy living habits.,,255 Despite this RSB, the appellate court 
found that the parents were making slow, but steady, improve-
ments in cleaning up the home and obtaining employment.256 The 
court reflected, "In preparing this opinion, the Court has read 
through many termination cases, and we are struck by the ab-
sence of any other factors besides the poverty of the family and 
poor living conditions in the home.,,257 By contrast, 
In most cases we also see prevalent physical or sexual abuse, drug 
and alcohol abuse, severe neglect and unconcern for the children's 
welfare, lack of medical care, lack of supervision, extreme physical 
and emotional delays in development of the children, mental illness 
of the parent, prostitution, severe mental incapacity of parent, crim-
inal activity, incarceration, or other equally egregious factor[s].258 
This case was about extreme poverty in a family that had known 
no other way of life. Thus, the parents' RSB was a frame by which 
to better understand the family. 
Yet in most RSB cases, courts are willing to view RSB as an 
explanation, but not as an excuse, for many of the same reasons 
identified by RSB defense opponents-namely, the practical and 
conceptual difficulties of excusing harmful conduct, especially 
when poverty is entangled with a variety of other disabilities. In 
these cases, the risk to children is simply too great. In In re A.H., 
the children were removed from their home in a public housing 
project in the District of Columbia due to filth, including feces on 
252. Id. 
253. Id. at *2. 
254. Id. at *l. 
255. Id. at *12. 
256. Id. 
257. Id. at *14. 
258. Id. 
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the floor and roaches crawling over open food left on the counters, 
as well as an oven turned on with the door open and a bathtub 
used as a toilet.259 According to testimony at the trial, the mother 
seemed desensitized to these surroundings and apathetic to her 
social worker. 260 The mother lacked a high school degree, had not 
worked since high school, and lived on welfare.261 
At trial, the social workers testified that the children "did not 
appear sick or malnourished; they had the required immuniza-
tions; they had clothing to wear; and the two children of school 
age were attending school.,,262 Moreover, the trial judge found that 
the District of Columbia was responsible for some of the atrocious 
conditions in the home by failing to repair them. 263 However, the 
judge found that the mother also bore responsibility for allowing 
her children to live in such conditions, and he was ''both troubled 
and perplexed by the 'strange nonchalance' that [the mother] dis-
played when confronted about the unsafe and unsanitary envi-
ronment in the home.,,264 The trial judge concluded that the moth-
er could have resolved the problems in the household despite her 
limited financial means.265 
On appeal, the court affirmed.266 The appellate court noted that 
"we cannot ignore or minimize the extent to which D.H.'s poverty 
and forces beyond her control helped create the circumstances in 
which she and her children lived."267 Yet the court was troubled 
that the poverty defense could subject the children to a risk of 
harm, stating that the poverty defense "has proved to be nettle-
some in both theory and practice," because of the tension between 
the defense and the statute's remedial purposes.26B The court 
forthrightly expressed its concerns by asking the following: "If a 
child is deprived of parental care 'necessary' for his physical 
health-for example, if the child is malnourished, not properly 
clothed, or denied medical care-why should the reason for the 
259. 842 A.2d 674, 677-80 (D.C. 2004). 
260. Id. at 680. 
261. Id. at 681. 
262. Id. at 680 n.9. 
263. Id. at 681. 
264. Id. at 682. 
265. Id. at 683. 
266. Id. at 690. 
267. Id. at 684. 
268. Id. at 686-87. 
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deprivation matter in deciding whether the state should be al-
lowed to intervene and protect the child?,,269 Similarly, RSB oppo-
nents charge that such a defense in criminal cases ignores the 
rights of the victims, most of whom share similarly deprived 
backgrounds.270 
For the D.C. court, "it should be enough if the evidence shows 
that parental poverty was not the only or the 'but for' cause:l27t 
Reviewing the evidence, the appellate court concluded that the 
conditions in the home were not due to a lack of money.272 Instead, 
it is clear to us that the judge could find that D,H.'s long-term fail-
ures to exert herself to keep feces off the floor, to dispose of rotten 
food and other trash, to clean the kitchen, and to complain and de-
mand that maintenance and repairs and exterminations be per-273 formed properly were not caused by D.H's lack of money, 
Thus, as is common in child neglect cases, poverty-even with-
in an RSB context-was narrowed to income. For this court at 
least, the poverty defense could result in harm to children, a re-
sult the court was unwilling to countenance. . 
Nevertheless, as another commentator has noted, it is possible 
that this family could have been reunited if the mother had been 
provided greater services, particularly mental health services, es-
pecially since the children in the case were not suffering any 
harm.274 Moreover, the court fails to acknowledge that two months 
after the children were removed, the District of Columbia accept-
ed more than $30 million from the federal government to demol-
ish the public housing complex where the family lived, with the 
mayor stating that "[t]he homes here ... represent the largest 
269, Id. at 687. 
270. See, e.g., Morse, supra note 4, at 158. 
271. In re A.H., 842 A.2d at 688. 
272, ld, at 689. 
273. ld, 
274, Jesse Lubin, Note, Are We Really Looking Out for the Best Interests of the Child? 
Applying the New Zealand Model of Family Group Conferences to Cases of Child Neglect in 
the United States, 47 FAM. CT. REV. 129, 138 (2009) ("rrJhe mothers could have been 
paired with service providers who could have helped with possible job training, better 
housing, proper medical services for the children, and anything else the mothers would 
need to quickly get their children back and into a safe home."), 
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and last of our severely distressed housing."m Nevertheless, D.H. 
lost her children largely due to the conditions of her home. 276 
An RSB-style poverty defense is also challenging because the 
worse the RSB, the less likely it seems the parents can overcome 
their difficult backgrounds. For example, in In re A.G., the court 
described the parents' wrenching personal histories rooted in 
poverty.277 The father had been orphaned at six months and lived 
in fifty-two foster homes, some of which were abusive. 278 Mter at-
tacking a fellow student at age fIfteen, he was institutionalized; 
then, upon returning from military service in Vietnam, he strug-
gled with substance abuse.279 For her part, the mother had been 
repeatedly sexually abused as a child by a male cousin over a ten-
year period, experienced blackouts and delusions, and was unable 
to hold a job for more than a month.280 The mother initially turned 
her newborn child over to foster care.281 While the child was in 
foster care, the parents' housing was unstable; however, the par-
ents attended parenting classes, improved their visitation regu-
larity, and submitted to psychological testing, which showed them 
to have a variety of mental health problems.282 Although the trial 
court found that the parents were making slow improvements 
pursuant to the social services case plan, the improvements were 
not enough to permit unsupervised visitation, let alone reunifica-
tion of the family.283 The appellate court commented that, while 
poverty and mental illness alone are not grounds for terminating 
the rights of parents, if they render a parent unable to perform as 
a parent, then termination is warranted.284 
275. Robert E. Pierre, Pr. George's Says it Pays Price for D.C. HUD Project, WASH. 
POST, Aug. 5, 2000, at B2. 
276. In re A.H., 842 A.2d at 690. 
277. In re A.G., No. C7-97-1977, 1998 WL 202779, at *1 (Minn. App. Ct. Apr. 28, 1998). 
278. ld. 
279. ld. 
280. ld. 
281. ld. 
282. ld. 
283. ld. at *5, *8. Many commentators have criticized the short timelines within AFSA 
for a permanency decision. See Richard P. Barth et aI., From Anticipation to Evidence: Re-
search on the Adoption and Safe Families Act, 12 VA. J. SOC. POLY & L. 371, 377 (2005); 
Jim Moye & Roberta Rinker, It's a Hard-Knock Life: Does the Adoption and Safe Families 
Act of 1977 Adequately Address Problems in the Child Welfare System?, 38 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 375, 388-89 (2002). 
284. In re A.G., 1998 WL 202779, at *4. 
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In this case, the RSB was simply too great. In criminal cases, 
commentators have noted that RSB not only does not excuse 
crimes, but rather, it usually increases punishment. 285 Likewise, 
an RSB-style poverty defense in child neglect cases seems to 
worsen the odds for family reunification. While states are obliged 
to use reasonable efforts to reunify families, parenting support 
programs face limited funding and courts thus usually interpret 
the reasonable efforts requirement to mean "available services."286 
To a court, a case that presents evidence of an RSB probably 
looks even more expensive and less likely to succeed than other 
cases. Moreover, hanging over every juvenile judge's head is the 
fear that she will reunite a family with disastrous and media-
publicized results. 287 A parent with an RSB can only enhance this 
fear. Accordingly, an RSB defense is as difficult in practice as its 
critics predict. While RSB helps explain the challenges facing 
some low-income parents, courts are usually reluctant to let it 
serve as a defense. 
C. The Poverty Defense as Social Forfeit 
The concept of social forfeit also emerges in child neglect cases 
involving the poverty defense and holds the most promise not on-
ly for families, but also for an expanded poverty defense. Social 
forfeit norms are enshrined in at least nine state statutes, which 
excuse child neglect caused by poverty, unless the parents have 
been offered and refused state services. 28B This type of definition 
imposes rights and responsibilities on both parents and the state 
and thus requires courts to examine the actions of both entities.28g 
285. See Delgado, Wretched of the Earth, supra note 4, at 6 (noting that courts not only 
have not recognized RSB, they sometimes enhance punishment based on RSB); cf. Robin-
son, supra note 68, at 61-62 (arguing that the stronger the RSB, the stronger the case for 
preventative detention). 
286. See Bean, supra note 239, at 365. 
287. See Matthew I. Fraidin, Stories Told and Untold: Confidentiality Laws and the 
Master Narrative of Child Welfare, 63 ME. L. REV. 1, 41 (2010) (explaining how the media's 
master narratives about child welfare that focus on monstrous and deviant parents make 
judges fearful of leaving children with their families). 
288. See supra notes 182-83 and accompanying text. 
289. See, e.g., S.H. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 949 So. 2d 356, 357 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2007) (overturning adjudication of dependency based on father's financial inability to 
provide for his children) (,,[Tlhe evidence at bar does not disclose any offer of services 
which were rejected by the father"); Brown v. Feaver, 726 So. 2d 322, 324 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1999) ("Homelessness, derived solely trom a custodian's financial inability, does not 
constitute abuse, neglect, or abandonment unless the Department offers services to the 
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As discussed earlier, social forfeit theory holds that society cannot 
condemn a person that society has failed to support.290 In the child 
neglect context, it means that the state cannot strip a poor parent 
of her rights without first offering some material aid or services; 
at the same time, the parent must be amenable to assistance and 
use such aid appropriately.291 Under this theory, the child neglect 
defense arises when both the state and the parent have failed to 
meet their mutual responsibilities. Professor Clare Huntington 
has described the parent-state relationship as one of mutual de-
pendency. Poor parents need support from the state, while the 
state needs supportive parents due to its "interest in ensuring a 
child develops into a citizen capable of participating in a delibera-
tive democracy, or, more basically, as an interest in the child 
growing up to be an adult who reqUIres minimal state spend-
• ,,292 
mg. 
The concept of social forfeit arises even when state neglect 
statutes do not directly impose duties on the state to provide, and 
the parents to accept, services. This is because the federal law 
that provides foster care funding requires state agencies to 
demonstrate that they have made reasonable efforts to provide 
assistance and services to preserve and reunify families. 293 Both 
Congress and the state legislatures, however, failed to further de-
fine "reasonable efforts."294 Moreover, courts are generally tenta-
tive in interpreting the reasonable efforts requirement, in part 
because states can lose federal foster care funding if the require-
ment is not met. 295 
homeless custodian and those services are rejected."). 
290. See supra text accompanying notes 46-56. 
291. [d. 
292. Huntington, supra note 151, at 1486-87. 
293. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997,42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(B)(ii) (2006). 
294. In turn, state statutes generally define reasonable efforts to require child welfare 
agencies to provide accessible, available, and culturally appropriate services designed to 
improve the capacity of parents to provide safe and stable homes for their children. See 
CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., REASONABLE EFFORTS TO 
PRESERVE AND REUNIFY F AMIUES AND ACHIEVE PERMANENCY FOR CHILDREN: SUMMARY OF 
STATE LAws (2009), available at http://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwidenaws-policies 
/statutes/reunifyall.pdf (providing a survey of state law definitions of "reasonable efforts.); 
see also Bean, supra note 239 at 329-31 (describing state differences). 
295. Bean, supra note 239, at 333-.34. "[C]ourts are fairly resolute that agencies need 
not do everything conceivable or be perfect in practice." [d. at 358; see Deborah Paruch, 
The Orphaning of Underprivileged Children: America's Failed Child Welfare Law and Pol-
icy, 8 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 119, 138-39 (2006) (noting that funding for reasonable efforts to 
reunify and preserve families is "subject to the arrival appropriation process" and can be 
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Nevertheless, there are still cases in which courts impose a 
strong view of social forfeit, and thus this theory is worth explor-
ing. For instance, in In re S.M. W discussed above, the court went 
to great lengths to highlight the efforts and the resilience of the 
mother in the face of inconsistent case plans and a lack of ser-
vices by the state. 296 Another example is New Jersey Division of 
Youth & Family Services v. S.R., which involved a single mother 
in her early twenties without a high school degree and who lived 
on welfare. 297 Her newborn baby needed a heart transplant, and 
the doctors became convinced that the mother did not have the 
wherewithal to maintain the baby's post-operative care routine.298 
The mother could not afford transportation between her home in 
New Jersey and the hospital in New York, and the Division of 
Youth and Family Services provided her with only a portion of 
the transportation costS.299 Due to the mother's lack of regular 
hospital visits, the Division removed the baby and placed her 
with a foster mother.30o 
In approving a permanency plan to terminate the mother's pa-
rental rights, the trial judge wrestled with the poverty defense, 
stating, ''With regard to [defendant's] financial situation, on the 
one hand, one might say, well, you shouldn't hold that against 
her. Well, what is the paramount importance? The safety of the 
child.,,301 The judge went on to criticize the mother's failures to 
overcome her poverty, asking, "[W]hat have you done to improve 
[your financial circumstances]? It's no different [now then [sic] it 
was before] and you are perilously close to be[ing] evicted, and 
not even being able to get a cab ride, to Fed. Ex. back a Halter 
monitor, with dire consequences for the child.,,302 Thus, the trial 
inadequate while foster care funds remain uncapped under Title IV·E of the Social Securi-
ty Act); see also Zuzana Murarova & Elizabeth Thornton, Federal Funding for Child Wel-
fare: What You Should Know, 29 CHILD L. PRAC. 33, 39 (2010) ("[S)tates receive federal 
funding to support foster care placements, but receive little money to provide services to 
keep children out of foster care or safely reunify their families after a removal to foster 
care. Thus, placing children in foster care costs states less than providing services to pre-
vent state placements or maintain families."). 
296. State ex rei. S.M.W., 771 So. 2d 160, 169-70 (La. Ct. App. 2000). 
297. 2011 WL 1045131, *1-2 (N.J. Super. App. Div. Mar. 24, 2011). 
298. Id. at *1. 
299. Id. at *2, *4. 
300. Id. at *1, *3. 
301. Id. at * 11 n.12 (alteration in original). 
302. Id. (alterations in original). 
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judge concluded that the foster home was a better setting for the 
child than the mother's home. 303 
The appellate court reversed, holding that the trial court im-
properly censured the mother for being poor, while failing to ex-
amine the actions of the Division. 304 The court stated that "the ev-
idence supported the judge's conclusion that defendant's efforts 
left much to be desired, but the efforts of the Division in this diffi-
cult situation were hardly reasonable.,,305 For example, the Divi-
sion did little more than provide the mother with part of her train 
fare, provided bus fare only pursuant to a court order, and re-
quired the mother to "get the money" for the subway leg of her 
journey and seek reimbursement later. aOG "Considering defend-
ant's extreme impoverished state-exacerbated by the loss of [So-
cial Security disability] income with the removal of [the baby] 
from her care and repeated eviction proceedings-the Division's 'ef-
forts' were hardly reasonable.,,307 The division expected extraordi-
nary efforts on the part of the mother, but "evinced a studied in-
difference to its own obligations.,,30B In short, "[t]he Division 
should have done more; in expecting defendant to move moun-
tains, it only handed her a shovel."ao9 
According to the appellate court, the Division early on pre-
ferred the foster mother and "provided only the barest of efforts 
in making it appear that it had assisted defendant, while essen-
tially ordaining defendant's failure.,,31o Whereas the mother 
struggled to visit her daughter in the hospital on $322 in monthly 
welfare benefits, the foster mother was paid $1100 a month to 
care for the child and thus could quit her job.3ll If the mother had 
gotten these foster care funds, she would likely have been able to 
comply with the case plan. Thus, comparing their situations was 
unfair, "otherwise, as has been recognized, such determinations 
would result in 'mass transfers of childre.n from ghettos and dis-
303. [d. at *11. 
304. [d. at *10, *11 & n.12. 
305. [d. at *9. 
306. Id. 
307. Id. 
308. Id. at *10. 
309. Id. 
310. Id. at *9. 
311. Id. at *3. 
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advantaged areas into more luxurious living accommodations but 
with resultant destruction of the natural parental bond. ",312 
While this opinion presents a strong view of social forfeit, it is 
important to note that the caseworkers and the trial judges hear-
ing the case below did not share this view. Every parental victory 
on appeal pulls back the curtain on the challenges facing poor 
families as they move through the child welfare system and, of 
course, only a small number of those parents have the resources 
and wherewithal to press their cases on appeaL313 Nevertheless, 
cases such as S.R. reflect a robust vision of mutual rights and re-
sponsibilities between the state and parents. In this vision, cul-
pability for poverty and responsibility for children's welfare is 
shared by both parents and the state. This approach thus moves 
beyond a rights-based framework to incorporate a notion of mu-
tual responsibilities. 
IV. LESSONS OF THE POVERTY DEFENSE 
The poverty defense in civil and criminal child neglect cases 
proves that a poverty defense is not the impracticable pipedream 
charged by critics. In fact, the poverty defense has made a differ-
ence by keeping some families intact that would otherwise have 
their parent-child bonds permanently severed. Its consequences 
are concrete. Accordingly, a poverty defense may hold promise for 
other areas of the law and cannot be as easily dismissed as its 
critics assume. Although the statutes do not define the scope of 
the child neglect poverty defense, at least three theoretical ap-
proaches emerge from the case law: (1) coercion; (2) RSB; and (3) 
social forfeit. The cases demonstrate that, regardless of the form 
of the defense, it will not succeed unless courts have a rich under-
standing of the causes and consequences of poverty. Success does 
not mean that parents always win; there are some cases in which 
no amount of services or support will lead to acceptable levels of 
parenting. The safety and security of children must be para-
mount. Accordingly, success can result when poor families are not 
312. Id. at *11 (quoting Doe v. G.D., 370 A.2d 27, 33 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976), 
affd sub nom. Doe v. Downey, 377 A.2d 626 (N.J. 1977». 
313. See Eamon & Kopels, supra note 250, at 824 (noting that there is no way to identi· 
fy all the cases involving removals of children for reasons of poverty due to that fact that 
most legal disputes do not proceed to trial and of those that do, only small percentages are 
appealed). 
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judged in isolation for their failings, but rather have their chal-
lenges and barriers taken into account within a larger societal 
context. Positive outcomes can include more reasonable treat-
ment plans, greater commitment of state resources for families, 
and a more careful assessment of whether parental failings are 
sufficiently harmful to justify removal. 
A. Understanding Poverty 
As the cases reveal, many courts simply do not understand or 
delve into the causes of poverty and its multi-dimensional effects, 
and thereby conflate poverty with culpability.3l4 The prevailing 
explanation for poverty in the United States is that behavioral 
choices cause poverty.3l5 In this "culture of poverty" perspective, 
the poor make deficient choices that trap them in poverty.3l6 This 
"culture of poverty" theory meshes well with the American myth 
of the meritocracy, which holds that anyone can pull themselves 
up by their bootstraps with hard work and determination.317 The 
flipside of this myth is that a failure to thrive in a capitalist econ-
omy is equated with moral failings. 3lB A neglectful parent is thus 
doubly to blame-she has failed both to succeed economically in a 
merit-based system and as a parent. As Martin Guggenheim has 
314. See supra notes 22-38,58-60,89,98-110,159,161,168-70,172-78,181 and ac· 
companying text. 
315. See JOEL F. HANDLER & YEHESKEL HAsENFELD, BLAME WELFARE, IGNORE 
POVERTY AND INEQUALITY 70 (2007); James Jennings, Persistent Poverty in the United 
States: Review of Theories and Explanations, in A NEW INTRODUCTION TO POVERTY: THE 
ROLE OF RACE, POWER, AND POLITICS 14, 18-19 (Louis Kushnick & James Jennings eds., 
1999) (summarizing behavioral theories); Frank Munger, Identity as a Weapon in the Mar· 
al Politics of Work and Poverty, in LABORING BELOW THE LINE: THE NEW ETHNOGRAPHY OF 
POVERTY, LOW·WAGE WORK, AND SURVIVAL IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 3 (Frank Munger 
ed., 2002) ("More strictly than other industrialized societies, we measure the worthiness of 
all our citizens by the level of their commitment to the labor market .... "). 
316. Oscar Lewis first articulated this theory within social science scholarship, con· 
cluding that poor people develop their own value system, which perpetuates itself over 
generations and is nearly impossible to escape-even if structural conditions change. Os· 
car Lewis, The Culture of Poverty, 35 TRANSACTION SOC. SCI. & MODERN SOC'y 7, 7 (1998). 
The people in this culture share a "strong feeling of marginality, of helplessness, of de· 
pendency, of not belonging .... Along with this feeling of powerlessness is a widespread 
feeling of inferiority, of personal unworthiness." Id. 
317. See STEPHEN J. MCNAMEE & ROBERT K. MILLER, JR., THE MERITOCRACY MYTH 1-2 
(2d ed. 2009); Mark R. Rank, Toward a New Understanding of American Poverty, 20 
WASH. U. J.L. & POL'y 17, 25 (2006). 
318. See GEORGE GILDER, WEALTH AND POVERTY 68 (1981) (''The only dependable route 
from poverty is always work, family, and faith ... the current poor ... are refusing to 
work hard"). 
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stated, most observers see child neglect as a family defect, "with 
limited or nonexistent societal roots," rather than a problem with 
societal roots.319 In light of this paradigm's focus on the individual, 
there is little call for collective responsibility or action to reduce 
poverty.320 Rather, this perspective "provides a justification for do-
ing so little.,,321 
A countervailing narrative of poverty is that structural forces 
cause poverty. This structural explanation for poverty holds that 
the poor are subject to forces that limit their economic opportuni-
ties and trap them in the underclass. 322 For instance, globaliza-
tion, the weakening of unions, and economic shifts from a manu-
facturing base to a service economy have left people lacking 
advanced degrees behind.323 Likewise, the lack of a living wage, 
affordable housing, or child care, keeps even working adults 
trapped below the poverty line. 324 In addition, a legacy of race dis-
crimination in housing and the workplace, as well as the criminal 
justice system, keeps poor people of color isolated from the main-
stream economy.325 Purely structural responses to poverty are few 
and far between, making the "poverty defense" in child neglect 
cases unique. Yet, structural explanations do not capture how in-
dividuals, living real lives, respond to and cope with these larger 
social and economic forces. For instance, a judge presiding over a 
child neglect case cannot ignore a hungry child because the local 
steel mill that formerly employed the parent has outsourced its 
work to China. The court must deal with the family before it. 
Accordingly, a more accurate conception of poverty places indi-
vidual choices within a framework of structural factors. Sociolo-
gist William Julius Wilson, who focuses on low-income, urban, 
319. Martin Guggenheim, Issues Surrounding Initial Intervention, 3 CARDOZO PUB. L. 
& POL'y& ETHICSJ. 359, 361 (2005). 
320. Rank, supra note 317, at 24. 
321. Id. at 25. 
322. See ICELAND, supra note 199, at 96; HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra note 315, at 
18; Jennings, supra note 315, at 1-2,21-26. 
323. See HANDLER & HAsENFELD, supra note 315, at 49; ICELAND, supra note 199, at 
76; DOUGLAS S. MASSEY, CATEGORICALLY UNEQUAL: THE AMERICAN STRATIFICATION 
SYSTEM 31-33 (2007). 
324. See Hfu'lDLER & HAsENFELD, supra note 315, at 151; MASSEY, supra note 323, at 
140, 166-68. 
325. MAsSEY, supra note 323, at 109; MCNAMEE & MILLER, supra note 317, at 192. 
"Discrimination arises out of competition for scarce resources and serves to protect group 
solidarity." ICELAND, supra note 199, at 80. 
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Mrican American communities, first advanced this perspective.326 
He acknowledges various social pathologies and dislocations with-
in the underclass, such as crime, teenage pregnancy, and a rise in 
single-mother families; however, he places these trends within a 
broader social context. 327 People who grow up in racially segregat-
ed, poor neighborhoods develop coping mechanisms and responses 
that "emergeD from patterns of racial exclusion" and that ulti-
mately limit social mobility.328 While conservative theorists blame 
the poor for making bad choices, Wilson explains that "structural 
factors are likely to playa far greater role than cultural factors in 
bringing about rapid neighborhood change.,,329 For instance, when 
the economy is strong, concentrated poverty and its associated 
pathologies decrease and vice versa. 330 If culture were as determi-
native as conservative theorists posit, increased economic oppor-
tunity would not have such a great impact in transforming poor 
communities.331 In short, "[c]ulture mediates the impact of struc-
tural forces such as racial segregation and poverty," and the re-
sultant behavior "often reinforces the very conditions that have 
emerged from structural inequities.,,332 Of course, structural fac-
tors combined with personal choices determine economic status 
for everyone, not simply the poor. 
In the years since Bazelon proposed the RSB defense, there has 
been extensive new psychological and social science research 
about how poverty influences behavior. 333 Psychologist Craig 
Haney surveys this research and concludes that "crime is often 
committed by persons whose early lives have been pervaded by a 
great many of ... potentially damaging risk factors and whose 
present circumstances include numerous environmental stress-
326. See WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE 
UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 12 (1987). 
327. Id. at 21-22. 
328. WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, MORE THAN JUST RACE: BEING BLACK AND POOR IN THE 
INNER CITY 43, 134 (2009). 
329. Id. at 57, 61. Wilson is widely acknowledged as making it acceptable within aca-
demic circles to discuss cultural factors that contribute to poverty. See Patricia Cohen, 
"Culture of Poverty" Makes a Comeback, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17,2010, at AI. 
330. See WILSON, supra note 328, at 57. 
331. Id. (citing PAUL JARGOWSKY, POVERTY AND PLACE: GHETTOS, BARRIOS, AND THE 
AMERICAN CITY 145 (1997». 
332. Id. at 133-34. 
333. See Craig Haney, Evolving Standards of Decency: Advancing the Nature and Logic 
of Capital Mitigation, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 835, 856-57,861-62 (2008) (describing advanc-
es in psychological research since the 1970s). Haney uses this research to recommend 
strategies for defense lawyers to use in the mitigation phase of capital cases. 
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ors.,,334 Poverty is both a major risk factor and an immediate 
stressor.335 AE Haney summarizes, poverty has negative effects on 
childhood development, including "lowered levels of self esteem, 
high levels of frustration, poor impulse control, and problematic 
intellectual performance and achievement."336 
Poor children are also exposed to "social toxins," such as violent 
neighborhoods and negative role models that skew them toward 
delinquency and crime and result in dysfunctional coping mecha-
nisms, such as drug addiction and gang membership.337 Faced 
with these risk factors, many poor children grow up to be poor 
adults mired in disadvantaged neighborhoods, where there are 
high rates of unemployment, transience, and inadequate hous-
ing.338 In turn, these environments can change the way people 
think about themselves, make them more likely to give into feel-
ings of desperation, and exert pressure on people to engage in il-
legal conduct.339 In sum, "[r]isk factors have a direct impact on in-
dividual development, increase the likelihood that someone will 
be exposed to other potentially debilitating risk factors, and make 
it more likely they will be exposed to problematic social contexts 
later in life.,,340 
This research suggests that with regard to a poverty defense 
there is a role for both the RSB emphasis on social history, as 
well as the necessity/duress approach to how financial hardship 
can severely restrict the options available to poor parents. To 
separate poverty from culpability, actors involved in the child 
welfare system will need to better understand this emerging re-
search, and lawyers for parents and children will need to educate 
child welfare workers and courts on how structural economic 
forces constrain parenting conduct. 341 This is not an easy task. To 
begin with, child welfare workers are often overworked and over-
334. [d. at 858. 
335. See id. at 864-65. 
336. [d. at 865. 
337. See id. at 871-73. 
338. See id, at 873-74. 
339. See id, at 874-75. 
340, [d. at 875. 
341. See TALIA GURSKY ET AL., POVERTY AND CHILD NEGLECT: EXPLORING SOLUTIONS 
THROUGH DIFFERENTIAL RESPONSE 61 (2007), available at http://ase.tufts,eduluep/degrees/ 
field_project_reportsf2007ITeam3_CFS_Report.pdf ("A poverty exemption explicitly stated 
in the state's legal code has the potential to disentangle poverty and neglect, but without 
specific training or practice to support it, the statute is ineffective."). 
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whelmed and have to make difficult decisions about child safety 
under pressure.342 Likewise, even though parents are generally 
entitled to representation in child dependency hearings and crim-
inal neglect hearings, those lawyers are similarly overburdened 
and may not have the time or resources to delve into larger social 
issues surrounding poverty and neglect. This is also true for 
counselor guardians ad litem appointed to represent children,343 
as well as judges.344 Moreover, child neglect hearings usually do 
not involve experts testifying on issues such as the availability of 
jobs in the local economy, the lack of affordable housing, or the 
accessibility of mental health resources. 345 While the child welfare 
agency may have experts at its disposal, low-income parents can-
not afford their own psychiatrists, therapists, and social workers 
to testify on their behalf.346 Further, participants within the child 
welfare system, including caseworkers, lawyers, and judges, carry 
their own implicit race, gender, and class biases and impose them 
on parents, who are disproportionately female, minority, and 
poor.347 
Despite these obstacles, the poverty defense in child neglect 
law can be effective. As the case law exhibits, some judges have 
noticed the economic realities facing poor parents or have taken 
an inquisitorial role by scrutinizing the findings of the state's ex-
perts. Lawyers for parents, and even some parents themselves, 
342. See generally Marcia Robinson Lowry & Sara Bartosz, Why Children Still Need a 
Lawyer, 41 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 199, 199-200 (2007). 
343. Id. at 207 ("Dependency court lawyers for children are as overburdened as are the 
case workers who are responsible for supervising the children's care on a day·to·day ba· 
sis."). 
344. Id. at 209. ("Family court judges carry enormous case dockets of their own and 
must do so with limited administrative support. These judges, therefore, must be able to 
rely on the competency and diligent preparation of the social workers and attorneys who 
appear before them to advocate for particular case services and permanency goals."). 
345. See generally Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 763 (1982) (discussing the state's 
ability to assemble its case as compared to parents). 
346. See id. ("The State may call on experts in family relations, psychology, and medi-
cine to bolster its case. Furthermore, the primary witnesses at the hearing will be the 
agency's own professional caseworkers whom the State has empowered both to investigate 
the family situation and to testify against the parents."). 
347. See Amy Sinden, "Why Won't Mom Cooperate?':' A Critique of Informality in Child 
Welfare Proceedings, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 339, 352 (1999) ("The professionals in the 
system are by and large well-educated, middle-class, and predominantly white. Mean-
while, many of the accused parents and their children are members of racial minority 
groups and virtually all are extremely poor with little formal education."); see also Roberts, 
supra note 14, at 161, 174 ("Judges and juries also import biases against the poor in apply-
ing the reasonable person standard used to determine neglect."). 
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have made compelling arguments about the difficult situations 
facing poor parents and the lack of state support. The challenge is 
to expand this sort of reasoning and advocacy throughout the 
child welfare system, preferably before these cases get to the liti-
gation stage. Possible strategies include increased training for 
case workers and other actors within the child welfare system 
about the nexus between poverty and neglect and the causes of 
poverty.348 The research is constantly emerging; however, it needs 
to be disseminated. Advocates for the poor and legal clinics can 
work together to distill localized economic data and to recruit in-
terdisciplinary experts who can translate structural information 
for case workers and courts. The child welfare system should also 
take better account of strengths within families, rather than fo-
cusing solely on pathologies.349 
Beyond individual cases, there have been multiple child wel-
fare class actions that have successfully presented evidence about 
structural factors in order to reform child welfare process and to 
obtain increased services for low-income children and parents.350 
348. See, e.g., Paul Knepper & Shannon M. Barton, Statewide Cross-Training as a 
Means of Court Reform in Child Protection Proceedings, 36 BRANDEIS J. FAM. L. 511, 512 
(1997) (describing training sessions for judges, social workers, attorneys, prosecutors, and 
other decision· makers designed to improve the child protection court process); see also 
Recommendations of the Conference on Achieving Justice: Parents and the Child Welfare 
System, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 337, 359 (2001). The working group recommended that: 
[d. 
Ongoing mandatory training should be provided by each agency/organization 
in the child welfare system for all players in the system, including, but not 
limited to, law enforcement, judges, lawyers, social workers, psychologists, 
medical professionals, and mandatory reporters, on how racial and ethnic 
stereotypes and sexism can impact decision· making. Training should include 
research and information on the unique situation created for parents raising 
children with extremely limited financial and limited local services. Training 
should include information and discussion on how to distinguish parents 
struggling because of poverty from parents who are neglecting their children. 
349. See Matthew I. Fraidin, Changing the Narrative of Child Welfare, 19 GEO. J. ON 
POV. L. & POL'Y 97, 105 (2002) ("[W)ith assets, wealth, power, and strength, we see [the 
mother] differently[; w]e learn from her, we admire her, we grow from knowing her.') 
350. See, e.g., Hansen v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 238 Cal. Rptr. 232 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987), In 
Hansen, the court held that the state welfare agency must assist all homeless families to 
obtain housing regardless of whether or not children were in the foster care system. Id. at 
240. The court considered evidence from a variety of experts and research reports about 
the causes and effects of homelessness on children. Id. at 240-41. See generally CHILD 
WELFARE LEAGUE OF AM., CHILD WELFARE CONSENT DECREES: ANALYSIS OF THIRTY· FIVE 
COURT ACTIONS FROM 1995 TO 2005 (2005) (analyzing child welfare class action litigation 
in thirty-two states); Lowery & Bartosz, supra note 342, at 210 ("Class actions have a 
proven track record of producing measurable positive results in reforming large child weI· 
fare systems."). 
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Class action litigation can typically harness greater advocacy re-
sources than individual cases.3Sl The dynamics of poverty and ne-
glect can also be discussed among participants in non-adversarial 
child welfare settings, such as family group conferencing and oth-
er fora that are increasingly being set up to address child ne-
glect. 352 In addition, legislators can be responsive to the effects of 
poverty by increasing funding for family support services; after 
all, it has been legislatures, not courts, that have largely created 
the poverty defense and the right to counsel in child welfare cas-
es.
353 For the poverty defense to realize its full potential, advo-
cates will need to think creatively and expand their notions of 
relevant evidence regarding both parental and state culpability. 
Similar strategies would be needed wherever the poverty defense 
expands. 
B. Expanding the Poverty Defense 
Some critics may find child neglect cases an ill-suited founda-
tion for expanding the poverty defense to other areas of the law. 
Perhaps child neglect is just too different from other crimes. Then 
again, each type of crime has its own definition, required mental 
state, pathologies, and causes, and each criminal act arises with-
in its own social context. For these reasons, Professor Stuart 
Green has argued that "a proper analysis of the relationship be-
tween distributive and redistributive justice should proceed on a 
case-by-case basis."354 He would consider the appropriateness of a 
poverty defense by examining the offense at issue, the precise 
form of the offender's disadvantage, and the economic and social 
circumstances of the victim.355 Given that the poverty defense has 
thus far emerged in response to only one type of wrongful con-
duct, a case-by-case approach based on particular crimes might 
351. Class actions can be controversial. See Peter Margulies, The New Class Action Ju-
risprudence and Public Interest Law, 25 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 487,489--90 (1999) 
("Class remedies in this area can, however, create additional inequities. Subgroups of chil-
dren within each class action each have needs for resources that in a finite world will be 
met only through sacrifices by other subgroups."). 
352. See, e.g., Joan Pennell, Mainstreaming Family Group Conferencing: Building and 
Sustaining Partnerships, INT'L INST. RESTORATNE PRAC. (Aug. 7, 1999), http://www.iirp. 
eduiarticle_detail.php?article_id=NDky. 
353. See, e.g., Virek S. Sankaran, Protecting a Parent's Right to counsel in Child Wel-
fare Cases, 13 MICH. CHILD WELFARE L.J. 2, 4 (2009). 
354. Green, supra note 10, at 44. 
355. Id. at 59, 70. 
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be more achievable than the generalized RSB defense advocated 
by Judge Bazelon and Professor Delgado. 
Under Professor Green's analysis, it is difficult to excuse or jus-
tify intentionally violent offenses against other people because 
the moral underpinnings of these offenses "do not depend on 
background considerations of social justice.,,356 This reasoning 
may explain why negligent conduct is sometimes excused in child 
welfare law, but intentional acts of abuse are not (even though 
many abusive acts are also rooted in RSB backgrounds). For its 
part, in 2012, the Supreme Court acknowledged the correlation 
between growing up in an environment of severe deprivation and 
crime in Miller v. Alabama but would not go as far to excuse the 
crime.307 In Miller, the Court held that life sentences for juvenile 
homicide offenders without the possibility of parole violated the 
Eighth Amendment's proscription on cruel and unusual punish-
ment. 85S The Court stated that a sentence of mandatory life with-
out parole not only ignores scientific research on juvenile brain 
development, but also "prevents taking into account the family 
and home environment that surrounds [the defendant]-and from 
which he cannot usually extricate himself-no matter how brutal 
or dysfunctional.,,359 The Court pointed out that the defendants 
whose cases were on appeal came from deprived backgrounds, 
commenting with regard to one of them, 
if ever a pathological background might have contributed to a 14· 
year-old's commission of a crime, it is here. Miller's stepfather physi-
cally abused him; his alcoholic and drug-addicted mother neglected 
him; he had been in and out of foster care as a result; and he had 
tried to kill himself four times, the fIrst when he should have been in 
kindergarten.36o 
Still, the Court demonstrated no willingness to excuse liability 
with regard to homicide, stating, "[t]hat Miller deserved severe 
punishment for killing [the victim] is beyond question.,,361 The 
Court did not explain why the RSB that supports mitigation of 
punishment does not also lessen liability. Others have argued 
356. Id. at 63. 
357. No. 10-9646, slip op. at 1, 16 (U.S. June 25, 2012). 
358. Id. at 16. 
359. Id. at 15. 
360. !d. at 16. 
361. Id. 
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that mitigation of punishment fits more comfortably within our 
legal system than does amelioration of liability.362 
Yet punishment is not the only option for dealing with wrong-
ful conduct. Depending on the crime, there may be creative op-
tions for excusing defendants while serving retributive and deter-
rence functions of the criminal law. For instance, in the child 
welfare system, greater resources and services for poor parents 
can often eliminate the "crime" altogether and ensure safety and 
security for children.363 For those parents whose RSB makes them 
unable to meet their children's needs even with state support, a 
variety of options can excuse their conduct while keeping children 
safe. Parents with an RSB defense could lose physical custody of 
their children while retaining visitation rights, so that family ties 
are not permanently severed.364 Alternatively, RSB parents could 
have the opportunity to petition to reinstate their parental rights 
in the future as their circumstances improve.365 Accordingly, in 
considering potential poverty defenses across the legal spectrum, 
it is important to remember that not all offenses pose the quan-
dary facing Judge Bazelon. In some cases, flexible and just solu-
tions may be available to excuse and support defendants while 
protecting the interests of victims and society. 
A poverty defense to non-violent crimes, in particular, avoids 
the public safety quandary. Starting with these crimes, a poverty 
defense may help to sharpen our assessment of individual and so-
cietal culpability and thereby produce more accurate judicial de-
362. See, e.g., Hefferman, supra note 74, at 70-72. 
363. See, e.g., Public Awareness & Creating Supportive Communities, CHILD WELFARE 
INFO. GATEWAY, http://www.childwelfare-gov/preventing/communities (last visited Dec. 10, 
2012). 
364. Marsha Garrison, Why Terminate Parental Rights?, 35 STAN. L. REV. 423, 425 
(1983) ("[P]ermanent placement that permits continued contact is better than adoption or 
any other placement that entails a total loss of contact with the natural parent.'). 
365. Nine states have statutes that permit parents to petition for reinstatement of pa-
rental rights following a termination. See Reinstatement of Parental Rights, NAT'L CONF. 
OF ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-researchlhuman ·services/reinstatement-
of-parental-rights-state-statute-sum.aspx (last visited Dec. 10, 2012). In relevant part, the 
NCSL has stated: 
Id. 
If a permanent placement has not been achieved within a specific timeframe, 
a petition may be filed with the court requesting reinstatement of the par-
ent's rights. If the court determines that the parent is now able to provide a 
safe home for the child, the request may be granted. The laws were developed 
in response to children who were aging out of the foster care system and re-
establishing ties with parents and family members. 
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cisions, more generous crime prevention strategies, and more ef-
fective interventions. The poverty defense could eliminate the in-
equity that arises in a system that punishes the wrongdoing of 
the poor with incarceration, while imposing lenient fines and reg-
ulatory controls on more affluent wrongdoers. 367 Of course, a pov-
erty defense is not the only way to avoid criminalizing poverty. 
Alternatives include mitigating punishments based on a defend-
ant's poverty or decriminalizing certain conduct altogether. The 
possible advantages of the poverty defense are that it allows de-
fendants to avoid the collateral consequences that accompany 
convictions, such as barriers to future employment and housing, 
as well as loss of certain public benefits and voting rights. A pov-
erty defense also retains the law's expressive effect of declaring 
certain conduct undesirable. The ideal solution is the elimination 
of poverty, which would make the poverty defense unnecessary. 
Until then, the poverty defense can break the assumed link be-
tween poverty and culpability. 
Crimes appropriate for a poverty defense might include "vic-
timless" crimes committed almost exclusively by the poor, includ-
ing the crimes related to homelessness, drug use, truancy, and 
turnstile jumping. These crimes are different from child neglect 
(in which the justice system is moving to protect a victim), but 
they are similarly rooted in poverty. In addition, the defense 
could extend to crimes of poverty-that is, crimes that people en-
gage in for economic survival-such as public benefits fraud, low-
level drug dealing, panhandling, prostitution and minor thefts. 368 
The defense might also cover crimes poor people commit in order 
to survive in a dangerous community, such as unlawful posses-
sion of a weapon. In addition, the poverty defense in child neglect 
cases should be adopted in the twenty-five states that currently 
lack the defense or, better yet, incorporated into Title 42 of the 
United States Code, the federal law that funds the foster care 
system. 369 As the justice system gains more experience with the 
poverty defense and becomes more sophisticated in understand-
ing poverty, the defense can be expanded to other forms of wrong-
ful conduct. 
367. Barbara Hudson, Punishing the Poor: Dilemmas of Justice and Difference, in 
FROM SOCIAL JUSTICE TO CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 10. 
368. Id. at 212 n.3 (defining crimes of poverty as those "whose rates are particularly 
sensitive to changes in employment and other economic indicators"). 
369. 42 U.S.C. § 674 (2006). 
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The social forfeit strain in child neglect law is particularly 
helpful in conceptualizing an expanded poverty defense. Courts 
using a social forfeit model examine the conduct and choices of 
both parents and the state in determining the causes and solu-
tions for alleged neglect. This model does not absolve individual 
wrongful conduct but rather apportions it in a context in which it 
can be better understood and hopefully ameliorated. It provides a 
theoretical basis for moving beyond individual responsibility to-
ward a model of mutual dependency, in which citizens and the 
state not only claim rights but also owe each other responsibili-
ties. Criminal justice scholars assume that such a "thick" view of 
citizen-state relationships is normatively impossible and/or theo-
retically undesirable. 370 But they have failed to notice the social 
forfeit strain in child neglect case law and how this approach 
could provide a framework for similarly thick approaches to other 
areas of the law. Judge Bazelon and Professor Delgado argue that 
society should be put on trial; the child neglect case law shows 
that this is possible without absolving individual responsibility.371 
While some courts are concerned about letting poor parents off 
the hook for conduct that would penalize richer parents, it is hard 
to conclude that the poverty defense gives poor parents a free 
pass to neglect their children. The child welfare system scrutiniz-
es allegedly neglectful poor parents, removes their children from 
their homes, and mandates parental compliance with extensive 
case plans.372 Even with a poverty defense, these parents must 
demonstrate the capacity, initiative, and responsibility to im-
prove their parenting. 
The alternative to the poverty defense is removal of children 
and termination of parental rights, and sometimes incarceration 
of parents. Yet foster care is no panacea, as there is ample evi-
dence that remaining in a setting of parental neglect is usually 
more beneficial for children than foster care. 373 Similarly, while 
370. See, e.g., Morse, supra note 62, at 152-53 (discussing problems with both the ap· 
plication and theoretical underpinnings at social forfeit theory); Taslitz, supra note 61, at 
81-82 (arguing that society cannot be held responsible for individual crimes). 
371. Bazelon, Morality of the Criminal Law, supra note 20, at 388-89, 401-02; Delga· 
do, Rotten Social Background, supra note 39, at 75, 77-78. 
372. See supra Section II. 
373. See Fraidin, supra note 287, at 25-30 (explaining why many maltreated children 
would fare better if left at home than if placed in foster care); see also Thea Liebmann, 
What's Missing from Foster Care Reform? The Need for Comprehensive, Realistic, and 
Compassionate Removal Standards, 28 RAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'y 141, 141-43 (2006). 
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incarceration is an easy, albeit expensive, way to. punish crimi-
nals, it has proven devastating to families and communities.374 A 
poverty defense can lead to more preventative programs by forc-
ing decision makers to confront the paucity of alternatives avail-
able to defendants. 375 When poor Americans lack viable alterna-
tives for avoiding wrongful conduct, individual culpability 
lessens. 
There is no evidence that the poverty defense has stigmatized 
individuals or communities by denying the poor moral agency. It 
does not presume that poor parents are culturally incapable of 
raising their children. Rather, the poverty defense recognizes that 
structural features within our society create financial hardship 
that sometimes leads to inadequate parenting. Furthermore, the 
defense is not applied in a blanket fashion; each defendant must 
show how her unique RSB or current economic condition excuses 
her specific conduct.376 Most poor parents are not charged with 
neglect, and the poverty defense indirectly acknowledges the re-
silience of these families in the face of economic inequality. As 
Thomas Ross has written, "Against all odds, facing social stigma 
and working through maddening systems of public assistance, the 
Professor Liebmann states: 
ld. 
The 520,000 children in foster care often live in unsafe and unsanitary condi-
tions, with poorly trained foster parents and without crucial mental health, 
medical, and education services. Even worse, children in foster care are 
abused and neglected at a greater rate than other children, and have an in-
creased risk of delinquency and other behavioral problems. The longer-term 
statistics are equally bleak. In a recent broad survey, foster alumni had dis-
proportionately more mental health disorders, significantly lower employ-
ment rates, less health insurance coverage, and a higher rate of homelessness 
when compared with the general population. 
374. See Roberts, supra note 11, at 1281 (discussing how mass inca;ceration harms Af-
rican American communities); cf. Fraidin, supra note 287, at 25-26 (discussing how chil-
dren removed from families because of suspected neglect are worse off in foster care). For a 
discussion of the costs of incarceration see JOHN SCHMITT ET AL., CTR. FOR ECON. & POL 'y 
RES., THE HIGH BUDGETARY COST OF INCARCERATION 10 (2010), available at http://www. 
cepr.net/documents/publications/incarceration-201O·06.pdf ("In 2008, federal, state, and 
local governments spent nearly $75 billion on corrections, with the large majority on in-
carceration.") . 
375. One emerging preventative approach is called differential response, which is a 
voluntary system for families where there is no immediate risk to children. GURSKY ET AL., 
supra note 341, at 9. In differential response programs, families are diverted from the 
child welfare system into preventative programs run by community, non-profit organiza-
tions. ld. These programs have proven to be cost-effective. ld. at 10. 
376. See Delgado, Rotten Social Background, supra note 39, at 66 ("[T]he theory re-
quires that a jury determine whether, in this particular defendant's case, a rotten social 
background amounts to a disability falling within a particular excusing condition."). 
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poor have survived. Many poor women and men have kept their 
families together and maintained safe and decent lives in the 
midst of conditions that would seem to make family disintegra-
tion inescapable.,,377 There is already a stigma to being poor in our 
society, but the stigma of being a neglectful parent is even 
worse.378 Thus far, the poverty defense has proven more helpful 
than harmful, not only keeping families together, but also giving 
some parents increased services and support. 
For some critics, this is simply too much-a poverty defense 
cannot and should not bear the weight of redistributive aims. 
This critique, however, is diminished in the context of child ne-
glect, where the poverty defense has been primarily a legislative 
creation. This limits condemnation of unelected jurists run 
amuck, and suggests a political avenue for expansion of the pov-
erty defense to other realms. At bottom, however, the critics are 
correct in that the poverty defense has not worked "a massive 
transformation of our social structure" and is unlikely to do SO.379 
A poverty defense does not reduce poverty, and parents in the 
child welfare system remain poor. However, the poverty defense 
shines a light on poverty, its effects, and the constrained choices 
it imposes. Understanding the problem is the first step towards 
fixing it. The ultimate goal is a shift from retributive penal poli-
cies to redistributive social policies, and greater safety and secu-
rity for all. As Judge Bazelon stated, "[R]ather than conceding the 
inevitability of social injustice and seeking the serenity to accept 
it, we must recognize its intolerability and search for the strength 
to change it.,,380 
CONCLUSION 
A poverty defense is not merely a hypothetical exercise, as is 
often assumed. Rather, there is a widespread poverty defense 
within the law of civil and criminal child neglect, and some fami-
lies have remained together as a result of the defense. The pov-
377. Thomas Ross, The Rhetoric of Poverty: Their Immorality, Our Helplessness, 79 
GEO. L. J. 1499, 1543 (1991). . 
378. In addition, there is the stigma and collateral consequences of being listed perma-
nently on a child abuse and neglect registry. See W. Todd Miller, The Central Registry 
Statute for Abuse and Neglect Matters is Constitutionally Flawed, 8 RUTGERS J. L. & PUB. 
POL'y 651, 652 (2011). 
379. Morse, supra note 4, at 158. 
380. Bazelon, Rejoinder, supra note 48, at 1273. 
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erty defense can make a difference. However, the poverty defense 
only fulfills its potential when actors in the child welfare system 
have a rich understanding of the causes and consequences of pov-
erty. When the child welfare system conflates poverty with culpa-
bility and ignores the structural realities of our economy, families 
are torn apart, children suffer, and society pays social and eco-
nomic costs. By contrast, when the child welfare system views 
poverty as structurally rooted, the poverty defense not only as-
sists individual poor defendants, but also benefits society more 
widely through redistributive consequences that can ultimately 
reduce crime. 
At its worst, the poverty defense fools us into thinking that we 
are compassionate about the challenges facing poor parents, 
when, in fact, we remove thousands of poor children from their 
parents each year. At its best, the poverty defense forces the child 
welfare system to confront the link between poverty and child ne-
glect and to consider societal responsibility for that link. In short, 
the poverty defense in child neglect cases reveals that such a de-
fense is neither as radically subversive of American law as its 
critics contend, nor as revolutionary as its proponents pronounce. 
It is, however, remarkable in American law. 
*** 
